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This Article rethinks the benefits and dangers of private force in war.  
It shows that privatization must be viewed within the special requirements 
and confines of national security policy making and weighed against 
available alternatives.  Contrary to academic and mainstream 
conventional wisdom, this Article concludes that national security 
privatization comports well with core constitutional and democratic 
principles and offers greater transparency and democratic control than 
commonly understood.  Moreover, this Article argues that the American 
use of privatized force reflects and accomplishes normative and 
democratic commitments of international and domestic law that would be 
impossible to replicate through other policy avenues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ARTICLE CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 855 
II.  THE CRITIQUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION...... 856 
A.  THE LEGAL VOID IN ASSESSING THE LEGITIMACY                                         
OF PRIVATIZATION .......................................................................... 857 
B.  THE ACADEMIC CRITIQUE OF PRIVATIZING                                         
NATIONAL SECURITY ...................................................................... 860 
C.  THE FALLACIES OF THE CRITIQUE ....................................................... 862 
III.  THE PUBLIC FORCE STANDARD: DISTINCTIONS                        
AND DIFFERENCES ........................................................................... 866 
A.  THE PROFIT MOTIVE ........................................................................... 868 
B.  THE EMPIRICAL CLAIMS ..................................................................... 870 
IV.  MILITARY EFFICACY AND DEMOCRATIC        
ACCOUNTABILITY............................................................................ 877 
A.  TRANSPARENCY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY                                 
AS CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS ............................ 877 
B.  WEIGHING THE BENEFITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY          
PRIVATIZATION—POLICY PREFERENCES AND                      
INTERNATIONAL NORMS ................................................................. 880 
C.  INSTRUMENTAL AND STRATEGIC EFFICACY                                                   
AND PRIVATIZATION ....................................................................... 885 
D.  THE ALTERNATIVES TO NATIONAL SECURITY                         
PRIVATIZATION ............................................................................... 889 
V.  THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES........... 892 
A.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROHIBITING PRIVATIZING                          
NATIONAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS ................................................... 892 
B.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONSEQUENCES                                              
OF THE LEGITIMIZATION AND INCORPORATION                                              
OF PRIVATE FORCE ......................................................................... 894 
VI.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 898 
 
 
  
Private Force / Public Goods 
SCOTT M. SULLIVAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When President George W. Bush announced the beginning of military 
action in Iraq in March 2003, he set in motion the largest deployment of 
private military firms abroad in U.S. history.  The number, scope of 
responsibilities, and publicized misdeeds of these private contractors raised 
substantial concern among the public. 
Six years after the initiation of the war in Iraq, President Barack 
Obama, a vocal critic of private military firms during his campaign, 
announced a surge of American troops to Afghanistan.1  The Afghanistan 
surge requires a parallel surge of military contractors into a theater where, 
as of March 2009, contractors outnumbered U.S. troops at a rate of more 
than two to one.2  According to military service requests, the private actors 
brought to Afghanistan will protect dignitaries and traveling convoys and 
guard U.S. bases near insurgent strongholds. 
Models for framing the appropriateness of private actors in national 
security span from outright prohibition to wholesale incorporation, with the 
former considered impractical, the latter unpalatable, and the middle 
unprincipled.  These extremes are rooted in different conceptions as to the 
nature of national security privatization relative to core public law values 
of policy efficacy, governmental accountability, and the diminution of 
human suffering inherent to war.  Proponents of private actors in national 
security tout the flexibility and ready availability of the market.  Opponents 
warn against the corrupting power of profit motive within armed conflict’s 
already ambiguous morality. 
The purpose of this Article is to bridge the gap between these views.  
Conceptions of public policy efficacy must be viewed relative to the 
accepted special requirements and limitations of national security policy, 
                                                                                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, LSU Law Center, J.D., University of Chicago, LL.M., European 
University Institute.  Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the 2009 National Security 
Faculty Forum; faculty presentations at the University of Chicago Law School, Washington University 
School of Law, Brooklyn Law School, the European University Institute, and the LSU Law Center.  I 
am grateful to all participants for their helpful and challenging comments and questions.  I owe great 
thanks to Robert Chesney, Simon Chesterman, Geoffrey Corn, David Glazier, Derek Jinks, Robert 
Knowles, Eugene Kontorovich, David Law, Brian Leiter, and Dan Rodriguez.  Sullivan is a member of 
PRIV-WAR, an E.U.-commissioned research consortium assessing the impact of the increasing use of 
private military companies and security companies in armed conflict. 
1 Anne Flaherty, Contractors Surge to Afghanistan, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/26/contractors-surge-to-afghanistan/. 
2 Id. 
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specifically lessened public visibility of government action and public 
intolerance for avoidable dangers.  Similarly, a genuine assessment of the 
danger of private actors has to operate against a baseline of their available 
alternatives.  Combining these concerns enables the movement toward a 
legal regime that can assure that the privatization of national security 
functions safeguards rather than corrupts other core public law values 
associated with American national security prerogatives. 
The argument proceeds in four parts.  Part II reviews the most common 
theoretical criticisms of privatizing force, which are framed around 
constitutional and democratic norms.  Most claims against privatization 
either prove too much (asserting that harms under their own terms not 
limited to the private sector) or too little (that harms are easily remedied 
through standard regulation).  As a result, the prevailing critiques fail to 
address the fundamental structural question of privatizing and outsourcing 
force. 
Part III examines contemporary privatization practice alongside the 
chief normative claims made against it.  Using empirical studies and 
comparative analysis, this Article argues that the perceived harms of 
private military companies (“PMCs”) are overblown.  Instead, the 
institutional structure and commercial characteristics of PMCs reflect little 
difference from the values reflected in public troops.  PMCs, in fact, 
exhibit characteristics meaningfully associated with proclivity toward legal 
and regulatory compliance. 
Part IV reviews the politics and values driving the need for private 
force and contemplates under-examined institutional and policy benefits 
privatized military services accrue to the State.  This section introduces a 
guiding principle that balances democratic accountability with military 
efficacy, which creates a reliable standard by which to judge PMC 
legitimacy.  Using this framework, this Article argues that the momentum 
of growth in the market for private force reflects, more than anything else, 
the democratic preferences of Western countries’ citizenry and a 
commitment to reducing the human cost of war consistent with 
international legal norms. 
Finally, Part V discusses the consequences of private force legitimated 
through the bifocal of democratic accountability and military efficacy. 
II.  THE CRITIQUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION 
A consensus has emerged within popular media and academic 
scholarship that privatizing national security functions through military 
contractors threatens fundamental notions of state sovereignty, democracy, 
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and constitutional norms.3  The current legal doctrine on national security 
privatization presents a void that lends itself to manipulative 
characterization by opponents and proponents of privatization alike.4  
Academic scholarship has proven incapable of filling the void.  Despite 
their influence in policy, the theoretical arguments debasing privatized 
force are ultimately unsatisfying.  These critiques tend to be thin at their 
foundations and overbroad in their applications. 
A.  The Legal Void in Assessing the Legitimacy of Privatization 
The privatization of governmental services has repeatedly arisen as a 
controversial topic of legal scholarship.5  The controversy inherent to 
privatization largely flows from a difficulty in identifying a definitive line 
separating core public responsibilities.6  This ambiguity, along with a 
renewed enthusiasm for cost-efficiency and belief in the virtues of the 
market, has spurred increased privatization of a variety of public goods and 
services over the course of the past forty years.7  As privatization has 
                                                                                                                          
3 See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 
170–71, 213–15 (2008) (discussing complications that privatized military firms pose to state 
sovereignty and their implications for democracy); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How 
Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. 
REV. 989, 1022–25 (2005) (arguing that reliance on private contractors jeopardizes democracy by 
avoiding checks and balances and creating a lack of transparency); Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence 
of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New 
World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75, 119, 145 (1998) (noting that security companies may have 
created a greater danger for state sovereignty); Nicholas von Hoffman, Contract Killers: How 
Privatizing the U.S. Military Subverts Public Oversight, HARPER’S MAG., June 2004, at 80 (“[T]he use 
of private contractors has reduced the military’s accountability with respect to the size of troop 
deployments overseas.”); Thomas Catan & Stephen Fidler, Private Companies on the Front Line, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Aug. 12, 2003, at A15 (“Many governments view PMCs as challenging states’ 
sovereignty and monopoly on legitimate violence.”). 
4 See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 25–27 
(2002) (discussing the movement of privatization as framed by “right-wing” and “left-wing” analysts). 
5 These scholars view the current use of PMCs as “a radical new development in military 
privatization” creating “the emergence of contemporary ‘mercenaries’ carrying out the assignments that 
were previously and exclusively reserved for uniformed American soldiers.”  Jon D. Michaels, Beyond 
Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1018–19 (2004). 
6 See MINOW, supra note 4, at 30 (noting that quintessentially private issues related to marriage 
and family invoke “decisions made by governments with important financial, reputational, and moral 
consequences”). 
7 Numerous accounts as to the basic benefits and detriments of privatization exist.  See, e.g., 
ELLIOT D. SCLAR, YOU DON’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF 
PRIVATIZATION 11–13 (2000) (discussing arguments for privatization based on the standard market 
model); Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and Public Values, 15 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 113 (2005) (noting that arguments about cost and efficiency are 
often a method of addressing accountability); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 155, 170 (2000) (noting that “the case for privatization has sounded largely in the language of 
cost savings”); Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization, 
46 AM. J. COMP. L. 481, 490 (Supp. 1998) (“Several courts seem to embrace the broad proposition that 
a federal court can and should reexamine the cost-benefit calculus supporting a decision about 
privatization . . . .”); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial 
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spread, the universe of government activities viewed as unmistakably 
public, and thus unmistakably inappropriate for privatization, has 
diminished.8 
National security functions have, in theory at least, remained one of the 
last areas of government perceived as “inherently governmental” and thus 
unsuitable for privatization or outsourcing.9  In a world where privatization 
has prevailed as a matter of practice, concerns of national security are 
described as “uniquely ill-suited to privatization” and “the last refuge of 
antiprivatization forces.”10  Given the pervasive mistrust toward privatizing 
national security functions, one would expect that elements of privatization 
in defense would be the exception rather than the rule. 
That is not the case.  In practice, the story is more complicated. 
Privatization and outsourcing have saturated U.S. national security since 
the Eisenhower administration.  The formation of NASA in 1958 
introduced the federal government’s first agency in which full-time private 
contractors ultimately outnumbered federal employees.11  The same decade 
                                                                                                                          
Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 83–84 (2003) (noting that advocates of privatization argue that it 
provides more efficiency, yet also acknowledging that a trend is emerging to analyze costs and benefits 
of privatization prior to outsourcing); David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 
CAL. L. REV. 393, 409–10 (2008) (noting transaction costs as a factor in choosing whether to privatize 
services).  The basic normative justification for the privatization movement is the claim that the 
delegation of governmental services to private industry is advantageous in both quantitative and 
qualitative measures.  In other words, privatized services cost less and are performed more effectively 
because the private sector can act untethered to political burdens innate to bureaucratic administration. 
8 Administrative guidance relating to national security is not excepted from this movement.  In 
2001, the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report argued that the Department of 
Defense should move the performance of non-core functions (e.g., war fighting) from uniformed 
service members to the private sector.  U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
REPORT 53–54 (2001) [hereinafter QDR REPORT].  Of course, this guidance itself is rife with 
characterization issues, and in this particular case, tautological.  See id. at 53 (noting that “[a]ny 
function that can be provided by the private sector is not a core government function”). 
9 Oversight Hearing to Review the Findings of the Commercial Activities Panel: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Technology and Procurement Policy of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 107th 
Cong. 33 (2002) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting 
Office), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house_hearings 
&docid=f:86063.pdf.  The GAO has provided little guidance to understanding the “inherently 
governmental function” test in national security, only that it is “clear that government workers need to 
perform certain warfighting, judicial, enforcement, regulatory, and policymaking functions . . . . Certain 
other capabilities, . . . such as those directly linked to national security, also must be retained in-house 
to help ensure effective mission execution.”  Id. at 33–34.  This guidance offers little to the issue of 
national security privatization.  No one doubts that the U.S. government must retain “certain 
warfighting” functions.  Id. at 34.  Similarly, according to the GAO, capabilities “directly linked to 
national security” must only be retained if demonstrable that in-house assistance helps “ensure effective 
mission execution.”  Id.  The exact characterization of an acceptable public/private division in national 
security varies along axes of the variety, typology, and degree of privatization and delegation.  See 
Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1422, 1444 (2003) (contending that “formulation and implementation of a country’s foreign or defense 
policy [cannot be outsourced] because complexity of objectives and unforeseeable contingencies render 
delegations of these functions to private actors highly problematic”). 
10 E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 303 (2000). 
11 Thomas P. Hughes, The Space Agency as Manager, SCI. MAG., Sept. 15, 1967, at 1298, 1299 
(reviewing ROBERT L. ROSHOLT, AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF NASA, 1958–1963 (1966)); see 
 
 2010] PRIVATE FORCE / PUBLIC GOODS 859 
also witnessed private contractors building the country’s first long-range 
ballistic missiles and designing high-tech military aircraft.12  Private 
contractors have manned and operated U.S. nuclear missile silos since their 
inception.13  In the 1960s, the military hired private contractors to train 
South Vietnamese troops prior to U.S. entrance in the Vietnam War.14  In 
1972, private contractors held thirty-six percent of all defense-related 
jobs.15  By 2000, that number had risen to fifty percent.16  One 1996 study 
concluded that every Department of Defense civil servant was 
outnumbered by five private contract and grant jobs.17  During 2007 and 
2008, the number of PMCs in the Iraqi theater was reported to have 
eclipsed the number of U.S. troops.18 
The disconnect between the theoretical admonition of privatizing 
national security functions and its pervasive practice stems from confused 
governmental guidelines covering contracting.  The Office of Management 
and Budget’s Circular No. A-76 establishes the U.S. government’s policy 
to proscribe outsourcing activities that are “inherently [g]overnmental” in 
nature.19  This test has proven hopelessly unhelpful in clarifying how to 
determine whether a particular governmental function is appropriate for 
outsourcing.20  Neither the OMB Circular nor accompanying interpretation 
                                                                                                                          
also Hearing Before the S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation Comm., 108th Cong. (2003) 
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (noting that “the privatization program that we see in government 
almost began with NASA”). 
12 See Howard Mingos, The Rise of the Aircraft Industry, in THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY: AN ANTHOLOGY (Gene R. Simonson ed., 1968). 
13 See R.L. Garwin, The Wrong Plan, BULL. ATOM. SCI., Mar./Apr. 2000, at 36. 
14 Barry Yeoman, Soldiers of Good Fortune, MOTHER JONES, May/June 2003, at 43. 
15 Ann R. Markusen, The Case Against Privatizing National Security, 16 GOVERNANCE 471, 474 
(2003). 
16 Id. 
17 PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 38 (1999). 
18 See, e.g., Ike Skelton, Chairman, House Armed Servs. Comm., Opening Statement: Hearing on 
Contingency Contracting: Implementing a Call for Urgent Reform (Apr. 10, 2008), available at 
http://armedservices.house.gov/list/speech/armedsvc_dem/skeltonos041008.shtml (noting that this is an 
“era where contractors outnumber soldiers on the battlefield”); Lauren Gregory, Increasing Reliance on 
Private Contractors in Iraq Raises Questions, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, May 2, 2008 (noting 
that one scholar “believes the number of contractors now outnumbers the total number of troops 
overseas”); T. Christian Miller, Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2007, at 
A1 (“There are more U.S.-paid private contractors than there are American combat troops in Iraq.”); 
James Risen, Use of Contractors in Iraq Costs Billions, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at 
A11 (“[E]mployees of private contractors now outnumber American troops [in the war zone].”).  Prior 
to the Iraq War, the number of public troops to civilian contractors had never exceeded a 3:1 ratio.  See 
Press Release, Sen. Kent Conrad, Conrad Warns of Dangerous Over-Reliance on Outsourcing in Iraq 
War (Aug. 12, 2008), available at http://conrad.senate.gov/pressroom/record.cfm?id=302012 
(summarizing a CBO report that stated that the current number of contracts is unprecedented and that 
“[t]he contractor-to-troop ratio is 2.5 times higher in Iraq than during the Korean War, and 5 times 
higher than during the Vietnam War”). 
19 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-76: PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL 
ACTIVITIES, Aug. 4, 1983 (revised 1999), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/ 
a076.html [hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-76]. 
20 See Simon Chesterman, We Can’t Spy . . . If We Can’t Buy!, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1055, 1069–73 
(2008) (examining the difficulty and malleability of the inherent governmental function test in the 
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provides principles useful in illuminating how and why certain functions 
accrue “inherently governmental” status.  As a result, the guiding policy is 
one of characterization rather than fact.21 
Under the Obama administration, the administrative prohibition on 
using contractors for “inherently governmental functions” is inapplicable 
to security contractors because those contractors are prohibited from 
engaging in offensive military action.22 
The open-ended nature of the inherently governmental function test 
reflects the reality that division between the public and private sphere has 
always been complicated.23  The intrinsic difficulty of identifying “public” 
and “private” functions is exacerbated when requiring a further parsing of 
such functions once they are identified as inherently “public.”24  As the 
“inherently governmental” test means little in and of itself, the question of 
the wisdom and appropriateness of privatizing elements of national 
security has fallen to scholars. 
B.  The Academic Critique of Privatizing National Security 
Two varieties of scholarly orientation form the core of the theoretical 
assault against national security privatization: (1) critiques of PMCs based 
in constitutional terms;25 and (2) concerns rooted in international relations 
                                                                                                                          
context of intelligence); Minow, supra note 3, at 1015 (noting that “disagreements over precisely what 
an inherently governmental activity is and gaps in governmental capacity contribute to ambiguity over 
what can or should be outsourced”). 
21 See Minow, supra note 3, at 1015 (noting that “disagreements over precisely what an inherently 
governmental activity is . . . contribute[s] to ambiguity over what can or should be outsourced”); Steven 
L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, 
Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549, 556 n.22 (2005) (discussing internal 
government conflict over “[c]hoosing between the labels ‘outsourcing’ and ‘competitive sourcing’”).  
In the view of one scholar, “the definition of ‘inherently governmental’ has thus emerged not as a 
sphere to be protected but rather as an exception to the more general push to privatization.”  
Chesterman, supra note 20, at 1070. 
22 See William Matthews, State Pays $1,222 Per Day for Contractor Security Guards, FED. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2008, at 8 (“Guards defending a base . . . are not engaged in inherently governmental 
activity because that is not offensive action . . . .”). 
23 See DEBORAH D. AVANT, THE MARKET FOR FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZING 
SECURITY 23–24 (2005) (“What is private (and by association, public) offers up a different set of 
confusions.”); JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 1, 4–6 (1981); MINOW, supra note 4, at 30 (noting that “the interconnections 
between public rules and private authority permitted by public rules make it difficult to sort out what is 
a private realm and what is not”). 
24 At its most expansive, all aspects and decisions affecting “national security,” the core 
organizing principle of the State, including procurement, weapons development, weapons maintenance, 
and providing health and other services to public troops, could be considered ill-suited for privatization.  
At its most narrow, all of national security could be privatized as long as the State reserved a sovereign 
right to dictate how such force would be used. 
25 See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 5, at 1009–10; Minow, supra note 3, at 999; Paul R. Verkuil, 
Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 439 (2006).  
For a more general examination of the constitutional challenges of privatization in the context of the 
state action doctrine, see Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1183–86 (1995); Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political 
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principles of state sovereignty and state control over the traditional “state 
monopoly” over the use of force.26 
Raising constitutional concerns, several legal scholars have argued that 
national security privatization poses risks to separation of powers, 
transparency, or fundamentals of democracy.27  Martha Minow intimates 
that private contractors disserve the military and create separation of 
powers concerns because “Congress would be largely constrained in 
reviewing the actions and practices of private military contractors.”28  In 
addition to a host of normative claims suggesting that private contractors 
degrade military culture and pose strategic risks due to their weakened 
resolve to risk death and overaggressive predisposition to use deadly force, 
Jon Michaels sees a constitutional and democratic risk in national security 
privatization.  Specifically, he argues that functional dominance of 
contractor control, oversight, and recruitment by the Executive Branch 
poses separation of powers problems in bypassing congressional checks 
over military action.29  Under his analysis, these harms are attached to 
privatization because “[i]f the Executive were . . . to deploy private troops 
in lieu of U.S. soldiers, it might be able to evade much of Congress’s 
oversight jurisdiction—at least temporarily.”30 
The international relations-oriented argument against national security 
privatization focuses on institutionalist concerns of state sovereignty and 
the state monopoly of legitimate violence.31  Under the argument advanced 
by political scientists like Deborah Avant and Anna Leander, the private 
military industry as an institution undermines “states’ collective ability to 
                                                                                                                          
Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1508–09, 1556–57 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1374–76 (2003). 
26 See, e.g., AVANT, supra note 23, at 65–66; Rita Abrahamsen & Michael C. Williams, Selling 
Security: Assessing the Impact of Military Privatization, 15 REV. INT’L  POL. ECON. 131, 133–34, 136, 
141 (2008) (reviewing four books and finding that “[m]uch first wave literature . . . tended to read the 
privatization of security as a prime example of the erosion of sovereignty and state power”); Steven 
Brayton, Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping, 55 J. INT’L AFF. 303, 
317–26 (2002) (examining the benefits and drawbacks to privatization of military force, including a 
focus on international peacekeeping); Markus Jachtenfuchs, The Monopoly of Legitimate Force: 
Denationalization, or Business as Usual?, 13 EUR. REV. 37, 39 (2005) (acknowledging privatization as 
a challenge to state monopoly on legitimate force); Anna Leander, The Market for Force: The 
Consequences of Privatizing Security, 11 J. INT’L REL. & DEV. 75 (2008) (book review). 
27 This is often couched as transparency or democratic concerns with a sharp constitutional edge.  
See supra note 3 (listing a variety of scholars with this angle implicit in their work). 
28 Minow, supra note 3, at 1025. 
29 See Michaels, supra note 5, at 1011, 1062–74 (arguing that contractors enable the President to: 
(1) evade congressional caps on the number of troops; (2) short circuit Congress’s oversight role; (3) 
evade Senate power over military appointments of officers; and (4) compromise congressional ability 
to regulate military disciplinary procedures). 
30 Id. at 1041. 
31 See AVANT, supra note 23, at 3–4 (discussing how private security affects the State’s control of 
force); Leander, supra note 26, at 75 (discussing how the market for force undermines the State’s 
ability to monopolize violence). 
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monopolize violence in the international system.”32  In this view, the state 
projection of force is a quintessential state function, over which any 
cession invites harms to military and foreign policy effectiveness.33  The 
precept of the state monopoly of violence is key to creating institutional 
hierarchy or organization as to how violence can be projected.34  The role 
of the State as the “superior authority” and only legitimate purveyor of 
violence helps “keep the lid on violence.”35  Breaking this monopoly 
results in lessened political and functional control over military action, thus 
compromising the role of the State as the exclusive arbiter over the 
purveyors and means of violence, and simultaneously, compromising the 
State’s ability to accomplish foreign policy goals through military force.36 
While the theoretical orientation of these groups differs, essential 
strands of analysis create cohesion among their diverging approaches.  The 
most prominent unifying thread is an underlying concern over the lack of 
accountability of contractors for crimes perpetrated in the field.37  Other 
scholars who focus their efforts on crafting reform proposals also 
emphasize this contractor accountability theme.38 
C.  The Fallacies of the Critique 
Developing a principled theory for assessing the legitimacy of 
privatized force in our constitutional structure is a fundamental question.  It 
compels answers to the secondary questions of contractor accountability, 
defines subsequent regulatory questions, and impacts policy frameworks 
affected by private actor performance (such as economic efficiency and the 
                                                                                                                          
32 AVANT, supra note 23, at 264.  Some scholars, including Deborah Avant, are helpfully specific 
in their paradigms of control, focusing on political, functional, and social control.  See id. at 40–41; see 
also Leander, supra note 26, at 75–77 (“We are talking about a change in one of the primary 
institutions of international life; ‘sovereignty’: a shift in the way that the use of force is controlled.”). 
33 See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of 
Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 147 (2005) (“[P]rivatization of 
the military is one area where privatization does not, or should not, occur.”).  After all, international 
law has often been criticized for having relatively weak enforcement mechanisms.  See, e.g., Louis 
Henkin, The Politics of Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY 
READINGS 17, 18–19 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998). 
34 See Anna Leander, Conditional Legitimacy, Reinterpreted Monopolies: Globalisation and the 
Evolving State Monopoly on Legitimate Violence, ISA Panel on Legitimacy and Violence: 
Globalization and the Displacement of the State, 31–35 (Mar. 24–27, 2002), available at 
http://www.ciaonet.org/coursepack/cp09/cp09b.pdf (arguing the extent to which globalization is 
affecting the state monopoly on legitimate violence). 
35 Id. at 5. 
36 See AVANT, supra note 23, at 75–76 (explaining how transnational financiers can take control 
of military forces and direct their attention away from public functions). 
37 See Minow, supra note 3, at 995–96 (noting that “[t]he prospect of unaccountable private 
military contractors is disturbing” and contending that it undermines human rights). 
38 See Dickinson, supra note 33, at 165–68 (discussing how the contractor accountability critique 
is driven by a legal regime that places individual criminal and civil liability within a morass of 
overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, statutes and policies). 
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size and traits of public forces).39  
The theoretical approaches offered by both legal and international 
relations scholars tend to become stranded in one of two dead ends: one 
where scholars are forced to engage in illusory line drawing between 
hopelessly intertwined conceptual dimensions; and a second, which 
emphasizes derivative issues of policy which can be capably handled 
through regulation.  Theories warning against privatization tend to prove 
too much (by implicitly rejecting a variety of acts far afield of military 
contracting) or too little (through emphasizing resolvable questions of 
process). 
1.  Illusory Line Drawing 
The quintessential public nature of national security is a fundamental 
trait of the theoretical critiques of national security privatization.  Despite 
the intuitive attraction, accepting national security as inherently public 
would require a principled assessment that lands it irretrievably and 
impermeably in the “public” sphere.40  Such a position would require a 
determination that national security is necessarily “public” because its 
private provision would cause societal harm and evade societal benefit.41 
There has never been a clear division of public and private functions.  
However, the prevalence of privatized governmental services, the 
expanded markets of globalized business, the interconnectedness provided 
by contemporary technology, and the predominant corporatization of the 
                                                                                                                          
39 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1285, 1292–93 (2003) (“Privatization coincides with other political and economic developments—
including globalization, free trade, market integration, and deregulation—that similarly reinforce an 
ideological preference for private over public ordering and market over noneconomic values.”); Daniel 
Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and 
the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 887–88 (2000) (noting that the Bell 
Report, written in 1962, dealt with many of the same questions about privatization and contractor 
accountability that are raised today). 
40 There are both theoretical and pragmatic sources for this position.  In the national security 
context, efficiency is the fundamental concern.  See QDR REPORT, supra note 8, at 53–54 (guiding the 
Department of Defense that only core public functions should not be privatized).  Expanded 
privatization in all contexts is encouraged to avoid governmental competition with domestic private 
business, an admonition explicitly part of the original OMB Circular A-76, but deleted “to avoid a 
presumption that the government should not compete for work to meet its own needs.”  Performance of 
Commercial Activities, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,134, 32,136 (May 29, 2003); see also Kevin J. Huyser et al., 
Competitive Sourcing, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2004, at 109, 111 (“[T]o emphasize the importance of 
competition in determining the best service provider for commercial activities, the Revised A-76 
‘deletes a longstanding statement that the government should not compete with its citizens.’”); OMB 
CIRCULAR NO. A-76, supra note 19 (requiring outsourcing where possible). 
41 See Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, § 5(2), 112 Stat. 
2382, 2384 (1998) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 501(2) (2006)) (prohibiting privatization of 
functions “so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government 
employees”); see also Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1614 (2001) (arguing that it is inappropriate when 
privatization cedes inherently governmental “exercise of discretion over the use of public authority and 
spending of public funds”). 
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free-market make such a determination even more challenging.42  
Traditionally, the drive for privatization is couched in economic terms.43  
Economically, necessarily “public” services are those that cannot be denied 
to people who refuse to pay and, thus, do not create a favorable market for 
private provision.44  Such a quality would exist where the service in 
question, much like national security, requires universal coverage and 
would encourage free riding.45  The “public” nature of a service, however, 
only speaks to a prohibition from public withdrawal in offering the service 
generally, not to the private provision of such a service.46  As a result, just 
as the State can privatize the manufacture of weaponry, “[i]t could in 
principle contract out the operation of that weaponry as well.”47 
Deviating from questions of the private provision of goods, national 
security privatization commentary has often focused on the ideological 
argument that privatization should be prohibited (or deeply limited) on 
concerns of discretion and importance.48  In making the claim that the 
privatization of force represents a distinctively public endeavor of 
discretion, scholars have pointed their criticism toward contractors of a 
lethal nature (i.e., armed) while avoiding contractors considered more 
benign, thus engaging in another line-drawing exercise that only 
exacerbates the theoretical problem.49  Couched in different terms such as 
active/passive, armed/non-armed, or lethal/non-lethal potential, the 
                                                                                                                          
42 See Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 7, at 174 (demonstrating the difficulty of 
determining public versus private functions by analyzing waste collection and prison operation as both 
public and private). 
43 See Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms, supra note 39, at 1299 n.50 (outlining the varied 
economic models that have been applied to privatization). 
44 See Posting of Richard Posner to the Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2006/05/privatizing_sec.html (May 28, 2006, 18:12 EST) (“[I]t is thought that only 
government can provide services that cannot be denied to people who refuse to pay for them, so that 
efficiency in a broader sense requires public provision of such services.”). 
45 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 948 (2005) (citing national security as a nonrivalry good and noticing that such 
goods open the door to free-riding); cf. Lisa L. Martin, Interests, Power, and Multilateralism, 46 INT’L 
ORG. 765, 771–72 (1992) (discussing free-riding in the context of multilateral security structures). 
46 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 (2d ed. 1997) (citing 
national security as an illustration of non-excludability); see also Frischmann, supra note 45, at 948 
(noting that “not all nonrival goods are produced by entities seeking to maximize profits”). 
47 Posting of Richard Posner, supra note 44. 
48 The belief that some services should not be privatized, regardless of economic impact, stems 
from the belief that privatization is “an illegitimate choice for organizing service provision, at least for 
those functions that are so inherently governmental as to be categorically nondelegable.”  Freeman, 
Extending Public Law Norms, supra note 39, at 1295. 
49 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 3, at 89 (creating a taxonomy that differentiates between “active” 
firms, whose employees are actually armed and in combat areas, and “passive” firms, who simply 
provide logistical support); Benjamin Perrin, Promoting Compliance of Private Security and Military 
Companies with International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 613, 622 (2006) 
(discussing the market demand for “disreputable” services).  Other work has focused on the 
armed/unarmed distinction.  See, e.g., Clive Walker & Dave Whyte, Contracting Out War?: Private 
Military Companies, Law and Regulation in the United Kingdom, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 651, 664–65 
(2005) (noting that forbidden activities could include “direct participation in combat operations”). 
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conceptual dilemma is the same.50  Clear lines between a Blackwater 
guard, an unmanned aerial drone operator, and a weapons logistical 
mechanic are impossible to materially differentiate within the dimension of 
public and private functions.51 
The sovereignty critique suffers from the same failings of public and 
private line drawing endemic to that of the legal scholarship.  It multiplies 
the complication by also failing to discern forms of sovereignty cession 
that are commonly accepted as not representing an accompanying loss of 
control. 
First, sovereignty in all forms possesses a character of a state right of 
dominion—of law, as authority, and as gatekeeper—the intrinsic nature of 
which creates a threshold determination of “public” powers residing in the 
State.52  Just as legal scholars struggle with the public and private 
characterization, international law scholars do so in the context of 
sovereignty as well. 
The argument that delegation of governmental services represents a 
forfeiture of sovereign power (in any degree) conflicts with conventional 
conceptions of sovereignty.53  Scholars have long accepted that questions 
of sovereign control reside within the realm of sovereignty gauged by the 
process and effectiveness of state decision making rather than the formal 
executor of those decisions.54  State national security is not an exception.  
For example, the complete outsourcing of Japan’s national security to the 
U.S. neither legally divests it of other sovereign powers nor demonstrates 
any functional inability to reassert sovereign powers (including defense) or 
effectuate the same goals through other policy points.  Just as treaty 
                                                                                                                          
50 Attempts have been made to bridge this divide, such as distinctions between PMCs and “private 
security firms” or distinguishing “active” from “passive” PMCs.  Recent reports about contractors in 
Iraq use various terms when referring to private contractors.  See, e.g., Spencer E. Ante, The Other U.S. 
Military, BUS. WK., May 31, 2004, at 76, 78 (“PMC”); David Barstow et al., Security Companies: 
Shadow Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A1 (“private commandos”); James Dao et al., 
Private Guards Take Big Risks, for Right Price, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at A1 (“private 
contractors”); Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: How the Department of Defense Mishandled 
the Disaster at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004, at 38, 42 (“civilian contractors”). 
51 For example, such classifications seem to make military training passive despite its purported 
central role in the sovereignty and public/private debate.  The same is true with intelligence contractors 
engaged in interrogations.  Similarly, many contractors engaged in the production of weapons and 
logistical support play essential roles in the lethality of armed attack and would be considered passive.  
See Patrick Radden Keefe, Iraq: America’s Private Armies, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 12, 2004, at 48 
(reviewing SINGER, supra note 3) (noting that the active/passive line “is blurred considerably by the 
many PMFs that engage in the ‘passive’ task of training troops in foreign countries”). 
52 The various forms of sovereignty include international legal sovereignty (the recognition of the 
State by international bodies and international law); Westphalian sovereignty (the right to exclude 
external actors from domestic authority); and domestic sovereignty (the right to act as ultimate 
authority).  See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 4 (1999). 
53 See id. at 224–25 (stating that domestic sovereignty is not necessarily compromised when rulers 
voluntarily invite external actors to interfere in their authority structures, such as through conventions). 
54 See id. at 210–12 (describing how, while the United States formally had supreme authority over 
Germany after World War II, the Americans could not pursue all of its policies due to the lack of 
German support). 
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regimes with reporting requirements and alliances among nations may 
complicate sovereign rights, the complication is undertaken as part of a 
presumed state interest in consenting to that exchange. 
2.  Secondary Issues of Regulation 
The vast majority of scholarship on national security privatization 
focuses on the specific issues of contractor accountability, which is 
unsurprising because concerns over privatization have coordinately risen 
alongside questions of how contractors would face prosecution for high-
profile criminal acts in Iraq.55  The emphasis on contractor accountability 
has created detailed and creative thinking in resolving regulatory questions 
emanating from national security privatization.56  These, however, are 
secondary issues. Liability frameworks, quality assurance, and 
military/contractor coordination are amenable to resolution through 
standard regulation that tells us little about whether and how contractors 
can legitimately take part in state force operations. 
III.  THE PUBLIC FORCE STANDARD:  DISTINCTIONS AND DIFFERENCES 
Why do attitudes toward national security, the “last refuge of 
antiprivatization forces,”57 deviate so far from contemporary taste 
regarding privatization?  The wisdom and theory of extending privatization 
to national security matters was left unexamined by the privatization 
scholarship boom of the 1980s and 1990s.  Its neglect ended decisively as 
private contractors poured into Iraq in support of the war and their 
participation was highlighted in events that shaped the conflict.58 
One might think that the relative silence of early privatization 
scholarship regarding national security simply reflects a tacit 
understanding that the subject matter represented an agreed backstop to the 
rapidly expanding privatization movement.  As noted above, however, 
national security privatization accelerated in lockstep with other forms of 
privatized governmental services and dates back to at least the Vietnam 
                                                                                                                          
55 See Dickinson, supra note 33, at 182–85 (noting that while private contractors participated in 
abusing prisoners at Abu Ghraib, few legal remedies against the contractors exist); Minow, supra note 
3, at 1005 (stating that “[m]anagement and oversight problems” exist with regards to contractors in the 
military); Schooner, supra note 21, at 555 (attributing the abuses at Abu Ghraib to contractor-related 
problems). 
56 The question of an understandable regulatory structure for prosecuting crimes perpetrated in 
Iraq by contractors is indeed of great importance, especially as it appears that the source of the dilemma 
is less a lack of law precluding effective prosecution and more an administrative matter.  See 
Dickinson, supra note 33, at 183–89 (describing the criminal and civil remedies one could obtain 
against a private contractor when the contractor has committed abuses, such as at Abu Ghraib). 
57 Michaels, supra note 5, at 1005 (citing E. S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 303 (2000)). 
58 E.g., Ante, supra note 50; Barstow et al., supra note 50; Dao et al., supra note 50. 
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War.59  More likely, the perceived pressing need to insulate national 
security from privatization emanates from a belief that combining profit 
and guns leads to normatively undesirable behaviors of both the private 
actor and the State.60 
Public disclosure of several allegations of contractor misconduct 
inflamed scholars and the public alike and appeared to confirm normative 
suspicions.  Contractors involved in the Abu Ghraib prison abuses, the 
alleged murder of an Iraqi official’s bodyguard, and the civilian shootings 
at Nisoor Square focused public attention on what several scholars called 
the “new mercenaries” and created new urgency in ensuring liability for 
contractor misdeeds.61  Apparent hesitancy of federal and military officials 
to file official charges against contractors accused of crimes combined with 
a Coalition Provisional Authority order that provided immunity to 
contractors for their acts exacerbated indignation and further spurred 
urgency for contractor accountability.62 
The reaction to incidents like Abu Ghraib sparked a tendency to 
extrapolate the negative character of the individual contractors to the 
private military services industry as a whole.  Normative complaints about 
PMCs arose, centering around characterizations that flow from their profit 
motive.  These normative complaints, which have been woven as support 
for the legal and theoretical complaints covered in Part II of this Article, 
belie the evidence.63  If valid, these complaints should be supportable by 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Law Regarding Civilian Combatants, Contractors Murky, Say Experts, TARGETED NEWS 
SERVICE, Nov. 20, 2007 (discussing the history of military contractors in relation to Iraq). 
60 See Christian Davenport et al., The Puzzle of Abu Ghraib: Are Democratic Institutions a 
Palliative or Panacea? 1 (Oct. 10, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing 
private sector incentivization and restraints relative to torture). 
61 See Thomas K. Adams, The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict, PARAMETERS, 
Summer 1999, at 103, 103–04, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/ 
99summer/adams.htm (describing “new mercenaries” as “militarily skilled groups and individuals who 
have no special ideological stake in the conflict at hand”); Dickinson, supra note 33, at 183–88 
(discussing the Abu Ghraib prison abuses in the context of stressing the need for legal remedies for 
contractors who participated in the abuse); J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status 
of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces, 57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 199 (2005) (expressing concern 
that “[i]f contractors misbehave, the armed forces may have limited options for dealing with the 
misconduct”); Mark A. Ries, Contingency Contractor Personnel: What To Do with Security 
Contractors, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2008, at 96, 96–97 (discussing a Blackwater employee’s murder of an 
Iraqi bodyguard and the Nisoor shootings, as well as the congressional and executive concerns that 
quickly followed). 
62 See COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NO. 17 (REVISED): STATUS OF THE 
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, MNF-IRAQ, CERTAIN MISSIONS & PERSONNEL IN IRAQ, June 
2004, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition 
__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf (immunizing Coalition Forces and contractors from Iraqi legal processes); 
John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 155, 161–62 (2008) (discussing the U.S. House of Representatives’ passage of legislation to 
extend criminal laws against contractors despite the administration’s lack of support and the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s prosecution of contractors in the aftermath of the killings at Nisoor Square). 
63 See SINGER, supra note 3, at 186–87 (discussing how private firms might operate differently if 
motivated by profit and will not be seen as a legitimate source of authority for keeping peace); 
Michaels, supra note 5, at 1007–09 (“[T]he introduction . . . of for-profit contractors, motivated to fight 
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empirical observation.  That is not the case. 
A.  The Profit Motive 
The concept of force privatization is rife with highly negative 
historical connotations due to the popular conceptions of mercenarism or 
soldiers of fortune.64  The profit motive concern derives from a belief that 
private actors are materially (and negatively) different from the public 
military’s citizen-soldier due to the fact that they work for companies that 
operate for profit.65  Under this view, these differences manifest 
themselves through a host of harms, including increased propensity toward 
violence threatening human rights and larger U.S. policy goals,66 
compromising the integrity of the military, and undermining transparency 
and democratic norms.67 
There is a core conceptual difficulty that infects all genres of 
privatization—assessing the impact of motivation.  The core difference 
driving the narrative of empirical claims is situated in the difference 
between public sector and private sector motives.68  The private sector 
                                                                                                                          
primarily by money and regulated loosely by contract . . . breeds an array of strategic and psychic 
harms for the military commanders, for uniformed soldiers in the field, and for Americans at home.”); 
Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call To Recognize and Regulate Private 
Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 60 (2003) (noting that mercenaries are mainly motivated by 
financial reasons); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and 
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 979–80 (2004) (examining a hypothetical 
situation to illustrate a private contractor’s motivation for money); Tina Garmon, Comment, 
Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility: Holding Private Military Firms Accountable 
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 331–34 (2003) (describing a private 
firm’s willingness to engage in violence because of “how easy it is to stray from lofty goals given 
financial returns”). 
64 SINGER, supra note 3, at 40. 
65 See id. at 44–45. 
66 See Rosky, supra note 63, at 943 (“The central claim is that private punishment, policing, and 
military corporations violate human rights more often than public punishment, policing, and military 
institutions.”). 
67 The potential for fraud is also frequently pointed to as a drawback to privatization.  I do not 
specifically address it above because it is less dependent on subsidiary dimensions that can be assessed 
independently from the overarching “private” nature of privatized force (e.g., training and 
qualifications in assessing war crime propensity).  It is true, for example, that procurement fraud cannot 
exist without procurement, and some level of fraud is intrinsic to privatization.  There is no evidence, 
however, that the cost of such fraud would supersede the cost of governmental waste that is similarly 
endemic to a purely public program.  See generally Stephen Schooner, Competitive Sourcing Policy: 
More Sail Than Rudder?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 263 (2004). 
68 The crucial role of motivation is unmistakable in the work of privatization opponents.  See 
David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost 
Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 107 (2005) (“[P]rivate entities’ profit 
motives may disserve relevant public functions.”); Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our 
Own Backyard: Incorporating International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights 
Law—A Case Study of Women in U.S. Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 71, 89 n.97 (2000) (“The profit 
motive prevents private corporations from working for the public good.”); Michaels, supra note 5, at 
1107–08 (“[T]o transform and possibly dilute the public service of national defense by introducing 
profit-motivated contractors may very well debase and commodify what has been the highest civic 
calling this or any other republic has known.”); Milliard, supra note 63, at 60 (stating that a 
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operates for profit.  The public sector operates for the public good.69  
Prognosticating as to the effects of these different motivations has been a 
crucial component of the privatization debate in a wide variety of regimes 
far afield from that of military force.  The effects of differing motivations 
of public and private gain in privatization are a source of disagreement 
among scholars.  As noted by Gillian Metzger, opponents of privatization 
typically argue that privatized services are compromised by shortcuts to 
fatten the bottom line while “privatization advocates maintain that, on the 
contrary, harnessing the profit motive of private actors and increasing 
competition in service provision improves the quality and efficiency of 
services.”70 
Privatization scholars have generally acknowledged that the diverging 
motivations of the public and private sector do not typically, in and of 
themselves, provide substantial insight as to the effects of privatization in 
delivering public goods and services.71  Instead, conclusions as to the 
impact of motivation are dependent on the observable subsidiary qualities 
of private actors engaged in delivering public services.  In this context, 
assessing the subsidiary qualities of the private sector requires examining 
whether the private nature of PMCs infuses negative dynamics into 
dimensions more closely tied to actions of private force.72 
                                                                                                                          
mercenary’s primary reason for killing is money); Minow, supra note 3, at 1020–22 (describing that 
when contractors work for money, concerns of fraud and loyalty exist).  Beyond the academic 
literature, the primacy of motive is also reflected in current international law treaties and the work of 
the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries.  See José Luis Gómez del Prado, 
President of the Working Group, Statement at the Human Rights Council on the Use of Mercenaries as 
Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination (Mar. 10, 
2008), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/docs/StatementHRC_7.doc 
(“These transnational companies are neither humanitarian actors nor peace-makers, and their 
motivations are fundamentally of a commercial character.”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasizing a mercenary’s motivation for “private 
gain”); International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 
G.A. Res. 44/34, U.N. GAOR, 44th sess., 72d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989) 
(defining a mercenary as one who is motivated to fight for private gain). 
69 Obviously, this representation of the fundamental motives of the private and public sectors is 
highly simplified.  Substantial data indicate that private actors often consider the public good, while 
public actors are often affected by calculations of personal gain.  See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: 
The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 670 (2004) (discussing 
“public officials . . . who may be driven by inappropriate motives such as personal gain”); Jennifer 
Roback, Beyond Equality, 82 GEO. L.J. 121, 127 (1993) (describing how some “people are quite 
comfortable with the notion that elected officials and public administrators are motivated by personal 
gain”).  The discussion below, however, operates under this binary characterization as the most 
generous light in which the prevailing empirical conclusions can be assessed. 
70 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1372 n.9 (2003). 
71 See, e.g., Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms, supra note 39, at 1339 (“[I]t seems both 
premature and drastic to suggest that the current trend toward privatization will, as a general and 
absolute matter, compromise public law norms, regardless of the context in which it is being tried, the 
availability of accountability mechanisms, and the intentions of government.”). 
72 The concern over the use of private actors in augmenting the armed forces is that privatization 
introduces the element of pecuniary gain in executing state policy through force.  The thinking here is 
 
 870 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:853 
B.  The Empirical Claims 
As Gary Becker noted, “To my knowledge there is no compelling 
evidence that American private guards in Iraq have been likely to behave 
irresponsibly, cowardly, or use excessive force.  The relevant comparison 
would be with the behavior of soldiers in Iraq, and I do not know of such 
comparisons.”73  Do contractors possess traits prone to normatively 
undesirable behavior relative to the behavior of the public soldiers?  In 
answering this question, dimensions of military culture, propensity for 
violence, and cost efficiency create the primary fields where contractor 
status is suspected by scholars to create normative harms. 
1.  Integrity / Culture of the Military 
A major concern of privatization is that the profit motive of contractors 
compromises the cultural norms of military life.74  Critics of privatization 
claim that the use of PMCs causes military brain drain,75 undermines 
military discipline and morale, and fractures the persona of the citizen-
soldier.76  Under this view, the use of PMCs undermines the military 
community and morale through higher pay for contractors (causing brain 
drain), the contractor’s ability to refuse to deploy or leave the theater, and 
“the possibility that privateers will comport themselves in an unbecoming 
manner.”77 
If the use of PMCs, independent of their unquestioned benefits in 
providing surge capacity and specialized (often technical) expertise, 
compromises the effectiveness of the public military in engaging in its 
primary goal of combat, then the entire industry of private force is called 
into question.  The unmistakable primary objective of the military is to 
offer a society a force capable of defending its territory and winning wars.  
                                                                                                                          
that the profit-seeking motive thus frustrates the proper functioning of the relationship that underscores 
military civilian control by turning the executors of that force into profit maximizers and, by necessity, 
compromising the purer virtues of self-sacrifice.  At the institutional level, this means that PMCs 
should seek to lower costs by shortchanging quality for capacity.  At the individual level, private forces 
should demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice the collective good of the force for either individual gain 
or institutional gain that redeposits back at the individual level. 
73 Posting of Gary Becker to the Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/ 
archives/2006/05/on_privatizing.html (May 28, 2006, 16:33 EST). 
74 See Michaels, supra note 5, at 1101 (“The introduction of private contractors—and their 
attempted integration into the American fighting forces—may also create a gap, a breach in America’s 
storied civic republican narrative such that now, perhaps, military service to the State will be even more 
disassociated with notions of citizenship than it already has begun to be in this era of an all-volunteer 
military; indeed, taking up arms will be viewed even more widely as yet another commercial 
relationship, not totally unlike catering or maintaining public grounds.”). 
75 See Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private 
Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 515 (2005) (“The pay is so good relative to 
military salaries that the US Special Forces are experiencing a ‘brain drain’ as well-trained troops 
depart for more lucrative positions with civilian contractors.”). 
76 Michaels, supra note 5, at 1095–97. 
77 Id. at 1096. 
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However, there are good reasons to be suspect of these claims.  Further, 
recent empirical studies indicate that such harms do not play out in 
practice. 
As a historical matter, the indoctrination of public soldiers into military 
culture during basic training has traditionally been considered of 
preeminent importance.78  The armed forces operate in a necessarily 
complicated moral atmosphere where certain core components of 
mainstream morality are overturned (i.e., the prohibition on killing) and 
popular mainstream virtues are suppressed (i.e., independence, challenging 
authority) for the sake of military efficiency.  In theory, public soldiers are 
indoctrinated in military culture in order to absorb complicated rules to 
facilitate navigating the resulting moral minefield and gain a sense of 
community housed within the pursuit of a larger purpose.79  Fidelity to this 
community, as well as adherence to military values of honor and courage, 
are fundamental to military culture.80  
Concerns over military retention rates and overall morale are essential 
to an all-volunteer force.  Morale is an important, if ubiquitous, concern for 
a military extended all over the world and engaged in multiple, 
simultaneous armed conflicts.  Similarly, sluggish military retention has 
been cited as a reason for unpopular and invasive stop-loss programs 
which have unilaterally extended soldiers’ contracts and forced them into 
unwanted deployments.81  In 2003, following the commencement of the 
Iraq War, the number of soldiers indicating intent to leave the military at 
the conclusion of their present assignment moved from about 12.5% to 
20%.82 
                                                                                                                          
78 See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 5, at 1088 (stating that the “inculcation of virtue and honor is 
accomplished through the ‘personal immersion’ in the ongoing ‘collective narrative of [the] corps,’ a 
narrative that is supplemented in part by an inward-looking sense of shared culture” (alteration in 
original)); see also id. at 1095 (noting that “the military goes to . . . extensive lengths to engender the 
appropriate level of cohesion, discipline, and camaraderie”). 
79 See STEPHEN PETER ROSEN, SOCIETIES AND MILITARY POWER: INDIA AND ITS ARMIES 6 
(1996) (discussing the importance of discipline to turn civilians into soldiers); Bruce D. Grant, U.S. 
Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consultants as a Tool of Foreign Policy (1998) (Inst. for 
Nat’l Strategic Studies, Strategy Essay Competition), http://web.archive.org/web/20020819173425/ 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/essaysch4.html (claiming that privatization undermines morale). 
80 See generally Earl F. Martin, America’s Anti-Standing Army Tradition and the Separate 
Community Doctrine, 76 MISS. L.J. 136 (2006) (tracing the listing of the U.S. standing army to 
illustrate the separation between military and civilian cultures); see also Michaels, supra note 5, at 
1084–88. 
81 Evan M. Wooten, Banging on the Backdoor Draft: The Constitutional Validity of Stop-Loss in 
the Military, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1061, 1063 (2005); see also Press Release, Sen. Frank R. 
Lautenberg, Military Groups and Veterans Call for Compensation for Soldiers Forced Into Extended 
Military Service (July 10, 2008), available at http://lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record. 
cfm?id=300474 (discussing the stop-loss policy and the hardships it imposes on soldiers, including 
mental trauma and increased divorce and suicide rates). 
82 See Charles Aldinger, Survey Suggests U.S. Military Retention Problems, REUTERS, Jan. 23, 
2004 (discussing a survey taken of 5000 Guard troops returning from Iraq and other overseas 
deployments and finding that the rate of those leaving the military after the end of their assignments 
could jump from 12.5% to more than 20% in 2004). 
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Military culture and the incorporation of private actors in exerting state 
force are not mutually exclusive.  Most contractors acting in an operational 
capacity have served in the military and are indoctrinated in its principles.  
Contractors who provide logistical support have spared public soldiers 
many of an enormous spectrum of mundane tasks of the potato peeling and 
latrine cleaning variety that defined the World War II era military.  To the 
extent there has been an increase in cynicism in the military and a societal 
downgrade in honor and prestige afforded to soldiers since World War II, 
it more likely reflects the rise of an all-volunteer force, the sociological 
remnants of Vietnam, and a pervasive mistrust of governmental entities, 
generally.83  Claims that public soldiers mistrust PMCs in a way that 
disrupts military culture shortchange the successful incorporation of 
foreign forces with U.S. forces in multinational operations and the relative 
separation of PMC duties from that engaged in by regular soldiers.84  The 
concern that PMCs and their contractors might fail to perform in dangerous 
circumstances has not proven to be true in the context of the Iraq War, 
where nearly all PMCs have deployed as contracted.85 
Empirical data assessing the mindset and relationship of the 
contractor/soldier relationship also contests the claims of disrupted military 
integrity and effectiveness.  Data suggest that members of the public 
military and contractors in all strata of PMCs possess the same motives for 
joining each institution and utilize similar reasoning for final 
determinations to stay or leave at the end of their contract.  The increased 
difficulties in retaining military personnel appear to reveal more traditional 
concerns than a rush for greener pastures.  All branches of the U.S. Armed 
Forces faced recruiting and retention shortfalls in the late 1990s.86  As 
                                                                                                                          
83 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Talking with My Friends: A Response to a Dialogue on Corporate 
Irresponsibility, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 988, 990 (2002); Jonathan D. Moreno, Bioethics and the 
National Security State, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 198, 204 (2004).  Obviously, and ironically, such 
mistrust is a force in the general movement toward privatization in other sectors as well. 
84 The Iraq War itself possesses a variety of different public actors, the cooperation and 
coordination with which public soldiers rely.  These relationships, as might be expected, create 
numerous obstacles.  While those obstacles undoubtedly cause operational difficulties, they are not 
typically viewed as a threat to the fabric of military discipline and culture. 
85 For example, in 2003, a total of 1.1% of British contractors failed to deploy in Iraq.  MATTHEW 
UTTLEY, CONTRACTORS ON DEPLOYED MILITARY OPERATIONS: UNITED KINGDOM POLICY AND 
DOCTRINE 49 (2005), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm? 
pubID=624.  While contractor “failure” attracts great attention, the number of those leaving the field is 
comparable to, and perhaps meaningfully less than, the number of U.S. military desertions during the 
same time period.  For example, in 2007, the U.S. had approximately 166,000 soldiers in the Iraqi 
theater and 4700 desertions were reported (about 2.8% of the public force).  Defense Secretary Gates 
Seeks To Build on Positive Momentum in Iraq, U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 5, 2007; Jay Price, Deserter May 
Fare Worse Due to Flight, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 17, 2008. 
86 See LAWRENCE KAPP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: RECRUITING 
AND RETENTION IN THE ACTIVE COMPONENT MILITARY: ARE THERE PROBLEMS? 1 (2002), available 
at http://hdl.handle.net/10207/1356 (discussing military retention and noting that over recent years the 
military services have experienced “recruiting and retention shortfalls” for their active component 
forces). 
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recently as 2004, surveys indicated that soldiers who had served in 
Afghanistan and Iraq predominantly indicated that their intention to leave 
the military was due to familial concerns (often relating to deployments) 
and general job dissatisfaction (primarily tied to feeling tied up by 
bureaucracy).87  Intent to leave the military in favor of private military 
service was not even on the radar.88  In contrast, studies indicate that 
“[n]either level of contact nor social comparisons with civilian contractors 
have a significant direct effect on intention to remain in service for military 
personnel.”89  Further, soldiers informed researchers that contractors 
possess similar experience as active duty soldiers, increase efficiency, 
increase effectiveness, free active duty personnel to focus on core military 
duties, and are equally motivated as soldiers to do a good job.90 
While PMCs are paid a higher salary, both contractors and soldiers 
acknowledge that public soldier benefits outstrip those of the contractor 
community.91  These non-salary-based advantages of job security, 
retirement benefits, and health benefits appear to effectively bridge the 
perception of economic disparity between them and their private 
counterparts.92  Outside of pay, public soldiers indicated that they believe 
that civilian contractors possess greater opportunities for autonomy and an 
ability to negotiate terms of their employment.93  Interestingly, the primary 
point of social disadvantage that soldiers feel relative to contractors is “the 
way the Army’s policies are put into practice,” in other words hurdles of 
governmental bureaucracy.94  Contractors and public soldiers had an 
identical score in their agreement that their work “makes a contribution to 
society.”95  Overall, the empirical data conclude that while soldiers feel 
somewhat disadvantaged on issues of pay and job flexibility, this 
disadvantage is ascribed to military structure and, as a result, the “social 
comparisons do not appear to impact service members’ feelings toward 
their civilian coworkers.”96 
                                                                                                                          
87 HOWARD M. WEISS ET AL., RETENTION IN THE ARMED FORCES: PAST APPROACHES AND NEW 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 14 (2003), available at http://www.cfs.purdue.edu/MFRI/pages/research/ 
Retention_Report.pdf (finding “non-work variables including such things as career development, 
limitations to geographical region, non-centrality of work/life values, and family considerations” as 
important in retention decisions). 
88 See id. 
89 See RYAN D. KELTY, CIVILIANIZATION OF THE MILITARY: SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS 
OF INTEGRATING CIVILIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL 150–51 (2005). 
90 Dr. Ryan Kelty, LTC Irving Smith & MAJ Darcy Langkamp, Dep’t of Behaviors Sciences & 
Leadership, U.S. Military Academy, Civilianizing the Military:  Effects on Unit Cohesion, 
Commitment, and Retention (June 2008) (presentation slides on file with author). 
91 Id. at 16. 
92 Id. at 153. 
93 Id. at 121. 
94 Id. at 130–31. 
95 Id. at 124. 
96 Id. at 162. 
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2.  A Propensity for Violence? 
The claim that private actors threaten human rights and larger U.S. 
policy goals emanates from a presumption that contractors are intrinsically 
more likely to use force, both lawful and unlawful, in the field.97  At the 
institutional level, the perceived propensity for violence stems from the tie 
between destruction in the field and the need for reconstruction contracts.  
At the individual level, critics suspect that selection effects and 
responsibility to private authorities for job performance result in a 
contracting base that is especially prone to violence and is apathetic toward 
larger collective policy goals.  Gideon Sjoberg has characterized the 
institutional concern as a military animation of “Joseph Schumpeter’s 
concept of creative destruction as the foundation of capitalist endeavor 
takes on new meaning in Iraq: the greater the destruction the greater the 
demand for goods and services.”98  Under this view, PMCs are inclined to 
inflict more damage than necessary as part of a larger commercial 
incentive to reap the benefits of the reconstruction contracts that would 
follow.  The quintessential example of this pattern is Halliburton, which 
has garnered over $15 billion in reconstruction contracts in Iraq, often 
through no-bid administrative award processes.99  As part of their 
reconstruction costs, Halliburton sub-contracts security services to other 
PMCs like Blackwater Worldwide.100  In a different but related vein, 
MPRI, which offers a diverse portfolio of military services, has been 
accused of manipulating information of foreign political circumstances to 
secure foreign military training contracts, the result of which potentially 
                                                                                                                          
97 In the words of ArmorGroup Senior Vice President James Schmitt, “At best, private security 
contractors are viewed as a necessary evil; and, at worst, as trigger happy thugs who sacrifice 
America’s reputation at home and abroad and damage its strategic operations by operating as if they 
were above the law in their pursuit of a quick, opportunistic buck.”  An Uneasy Relationship: U.S. 
Reliance on Private Security Firms in Overseas Operations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of James D. Schmitt, 
Senior Vice President, ArmorGroup); see also Ries, supra note 61, at 96 (noting that allegations of 
excessive force of contractors have resulted in a reactionary response to privatization). 
98 Gideon Sjoberg, The Corporate Control Industry and Human Rights: The Case of Iraq, 4 J. 
HUM. RTS. 95, 98 (2005). 
99 See Harry Maurer, Marching Orders for Halliburton, BUS. WK., July 24, 2006, at 25 (stating 
that Halliburton has taken in roughly $15 billion since 2001); Op-Ed., Sharing the Riches of War, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., July 25, 2006, at 6 (stating that the Army has placed $17 billion worth of orders for Iraq 
services, of which $15 billion has gone to Halliburton); Cary O’Reilly, Government Won’t Join 
Lawsuit; “Whistle-Blower” Says Halliburton Overcharged for Iraqi Recreation, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 
9, 2006, at 3 (discussing a lawsuit that alleges that Halliburton overcharged the government for 
recreation facilities in Iraq, and also was awarded $15 billion in private military contracts from the 
government). 
100 See Jim Mullins, Editorial, Privatizing the War Has Unpleasant Costs, SUN-SENTINEL (Fla.), 
May 22, 2004, at A15 (stating that Halliburton and other primary pentagon contractors subcontract with 
security companies); New Documents Reveal Unauthorized Halliburton Security Subcontracts in Iraq, 
U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 7, 2006 (discussing new documents obtained by Reps. Waxman and Van Hollen 
that disclose that Halliburton had security subcontracts with Blackwater). 
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increased the level of fighting on the ground.101 
At the individual level, it is commonly accepted that “security 
contractors are more likely to commit violations of the laws of war when 
they become involved in difficult security operations.”102  The “prone to 
violence” claim against PMCs has also been cited by legislators as a 
fundamental basis for barring PMCs from certain activities.103 
The data, however, does not bear out these claims.  The likelihood of 
both PMCs and public soldiers using violence, especially unlawful 
violence, reflect independently associated variables such as training level 
and military experience.104  As in the public military, PMCs possess 
varying degrees of training and military experience.  Over seventy percent 
of the PMCs employed in Iraq are believed to have served in a Western 
military institution.105  During the course of their military service, many 
future contractors act as part of their military’s special operations forces, 
requiring the highest level of training one typically receives in military 
life.106  Private contractor experience also provides crucial experience in 
military-oriented nation building roles, such as civilian policing, of which 
the public force is otherwise completely bereft.107 
                                                                                                                          
101 See Michaels, supra note 5, at 1099 (“Whereas presumably many regular soldiers would gladly 
forgo their ‘danger pay’ to be stateside with their families and out of harm’s way, contractors’ 
livelihoods depend on the continuation—if not exacerbation—of conflict.”). 
102 See Scott Horton, War Profiteering and Other Contractors Crimes Committed Overseas: 
Hearing on H.R. 369 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 52 (2007) (statement of Scott Horton, Adjunct Professor, 
Columbia University School of Law), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/ 
36173.pdf (arguing that, in contrast to the number of prosecutions of contractors, their lack of training 
intimates a likelier draw to unlawful violence); Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Drowning in Blackwater: How 
Weak Accountability over Private Security Contractors Significantly Undermines Counterinsurgency 
Efforts, ARMY LAW., July, 2008, at 64 (quoting Colonel Thomas X. Hammes stating that to do what 
they are “tasked to do” occasionally calls for contractors to be “very aggressive”). 
103 See 154 CONG. REC. S8045 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2008) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (stating that 
a bar on private interrogators was necessary because “the use of contractors leads to more brutal 
interrogations than if they were done by Government employees”). 
104 Western military experience is emphasized as the most important axis.  This consideration is 
largely a proxy for a belief that the contractor has been immersed in tenets of military discipline.  See 
Luis Gómez del Prado, supra note 68, at 4 (noting that hiring former military and police is common 
and necessary for the viability of private contractors). 
105 See Schmitt, supra note 75, at 515 (stating that Blackwater has admitted that thirty percent of 
its employees do not have any military training).  Of course, any percentage below 100% of military 
service could place PMCs at a disfavored position.  In that vein, it is important to remember that nearly 
all of the remaining contractors possess experience within domestic law enforcement or other related 
contexts. 
106 Steve Fainaru, Private Armies: Security Contractors in Iraq, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, July 30, 
2007 (on file with author).  Recent revelations have also indicated that contractors in Iraq often act in 
tandem with U.S. Special Forces in support roles.  See R. Jeffrey Smith & Joby Warrick, Blackwater 
Tied to Clandestine CIA Raids, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2009, at A2. 
107 See Contractor Training of Afghan National Security Forces: Hearing Before the Commission 
on Wartime Contracting (2009) (statement of Ambassador (Ret.) Kenneth Moorefield, Assistant 
Inspector General for Special Plans & Operations for the GWOT and Southwest Asia), available at 
http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/hearing2009-12-18_transcript.pdf (“I would note that, for 
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PMC job preparedness is likely greater than these numbers indicate, 
due to the limited scope of services that PMCs provide.  Individuals who 
have never received formal training within the context of a public military 
receive more focused, job-specific training in a shorter time period than 
typically experienced by public soldiers.  Soldiers are purposefully trained 
on a variety of tasks and responsibilities and then often rotated through 
numerous different posts.108  In contrast, unmanned vehicle operators, 
weapon maintenance and personal security contractors can sacrifice the 
breadth of training in order to accumulate and hone a specific skill set 
required for accomplishing specific job requirements.109 
Other demographic factors also tend to indicate that PMCs—especially 
security contractors—are no more likely to engage in unlawful violence in 
their employment.  Demographic factors of age, education, marital status, 
and the presence of children correlate with a lower likelihood to engage in 
crime generally, and unlawful violence in particular.110  PMCs serving 
abroad are on average 54% older than their public soldier counterparts 
(averaging 40 years old in comparison to 26 years old for public soldiers in 
the Army).111  Contractors are more than twice as likely to have a post-high 
school diploma (67% of civilian contractors possess a post-high school 
diploma, compared to 32% of soldiers in the Army).112  PMCs are also 
more than twice as likely to be married at the time of their service (73% to 
44%)113 and are almost twice as likely to have children than those in the 
public military (1.2% to 0.64%).114 
One might think that the overarching profit-motive aspect of private 
actors may somehow create selection effects that would render traditional 
gauges of violence propensity inapplicable.  Specifically, the idea that 
PMCs work for monetary gain is manifestly different than the motivating 
factors for public troops.115  Such analysis ignores empirical evidence that 
pecuniary gain also serves as the predominant reason for individuals to join 
(and remain in) the armed forces.  Similarly, the desire to serve the public 
good represents an equivalent reason for PMCs to become public soldiers 
                                                                                                                          
example, in the police training mission, they bring uniquely necessary skill sets to the table.  
Obviously, our military personnel . . . generally [lack] . . . civilian police experience.”). 
108 Id. (statement of Michael Strain, Program Executive, Counter Narcoterrorism Technology 
Program Office, Department of Defense). 
109 See KELTY, supra note 89, at 21 (noting that “outsourcing is motivated by a desire to increase 
flexibility by targeting qualified labor for specific project goals without carrying long term costs for 
training and maintaining personnel”). 
110 See generally RONALD BARRI FLOWERS, DEMOGRAPHICS AND CRIMINALITY: THE 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIME IN AMERICA (1989) (discussing certain offender characteristics). 
111 Id. at 113. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 6. 
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and enlist.116 
IV.  MILITARY EFFICACY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
The distinctions in character between private contractors and public 
employees prove ambiguous, and the theory upon which scholarly critiques 
of national security privatization rely is substantively untenable.  The 
belief that contractors create an insuperable obstacle to democratic 
accountability117 (as opposed to contractor or PMC accountability) 
represents the core concern that must be judged in examining the 
legitimacy of private actor force.  In the context of national security 
privatization, democratic accountability encompasses a concern that the 
use of private actors inappropriately or unlawfully insulates government 
officials, intentionally or unintentionally, from the political consequences 
of their decisions.  The democratic accountability concern must be judged 
within a larger context of the democratic benefits and normative 
advantages provided by private actors. 
A.  Transparency and Democratic Accountability as Constitutional and 
Democratic Norms 
Democratic accountability asks whether a government practice, such as 
the use of privatized force, effectively short-circuits proper democratic 
checks on government power and simultaneously precludes the ability of 
the electorate to recognize and respond to that practice.  Democratic 
accountability is inextricably tied to legitimacy because its purpose is to 
keep policy decisions by political officials roughly in line with and 
responsive to the policy preferences of the public.118  In a constitutional 
system, democratic accountability requires those in power to accept 
responsibility for their actions and the consequences of their policy 
choices.119  Its effectiveness is dependent on answerability (public access 
to information and justification for government actions and decisions) and 
                                                                                                                          
116 The desire to serve one’s country through contracting is consistent with the fact that such large 
numbers of PMCs previously served in the national armed forces.  Private military contracting offers 
additional flexibility to a contractor to commit to a reduced period of service, rather than the several 
years of service required for reenlistment.  This flexibility is most likely of particular importance in the 
United States to individuals who serve for more than twenty years, and consequently have already 
accrued the full panoply of retirement benefits. 
117 Several terms refer to democratic accountability, including government accountability and 
political accountability, which I use interchangeably throughout this Article. 
118 See Delmer D. Dunn, Accountability, Democratic Theory, and Higher Education, 17 EDUC. 
POL’Y 60, 61 (2003) (“Accountability is the price citizens extract for conferring substantial 
administrative discretion and policy responsibility on both elected and appointed government 
personnel.”). 
119 See Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in TAMING 
GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130, 140 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 
eds., 2003) (describing the accountability relationship of power wielders to broad publics). 
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enforcement (the capacity of the public to punish officials for policy 
choices the public does not endorse).120 
As discussed in the Introduction, commentators have criticized the 
“lack of transparency” of PMC action,121 coupled with the dominion of the 
executive over PMC action, as creating a threat to the separation of powers 
and limited governance.122  The democratic accountability test possesses 
some synergy with the criticism that the use of PMCs inhibits 
governmental transparency and invokes separation of powers issues.  The 
requirement of governmental accountability in using private forces is not 
concerned with the actions of the private sector as the private sector, but 
rather, as the ability of the public to gauge how its government is using 
private forces and whether that usage is consistent with democratic will.  
Peter Singer, of the Brookings Institution, argues that the use of contractors 
“lets policymakers dodge tough, politically costly decisions” and thus 
avoid the full costs of having the country at war.123  The political ease of 
using contractors is presumably a by-product of the lessened political 
damages their deaths cause when (or if) they are reported at all.124 
The question of democratic accountability in privatizing force has been 
heightened by indications that the government has used PMCs in order to 
shield itself from political fire.  For example, some officials have indicated 
that PMCs could be used for specific operations because they do not wear 
American uniforms.125  PMCs can also be used to effectuate U.S. policy 
goals by allowing them to train and coordinate with allied militaries when 
the U.S. is unwilling to provide troops (for political reasons).126  Unwilling 
                                                                                                                          
120 Id. 
121 Minow, supra note 3, at 999. 
122 Michaels, supra note 5, at 1052–53. 
123 Peter Singer, Sure, He’s Got Guns for Hire.  But They’re Just Not Worth It, WASH. POST, Oct. 
7, 2007, at B1. 
124 See Private Armies Also Fight; Hired Help Globally Eases Strain on Overworked U.S. Forces, 
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 2, 2003, at A5 (“[T]he use of contractors also hides the true costs of war.  
Their dead aren’t added to official body counts.”).  The belief that contractor deaths are mourned less 
by the U.S. population, however, is questioned by the limited empirical data on the subject.  In a recent 
study, individuals responding to news of a contractor death found it equally as sad as the death of a 
soldier, despite being prone to viewing the contractor’s participation in the conflict as motivated by 
pecuniary gain.  See Deborah Avant & Lee Sigelman, Globalization, Private Security, and the 
Democratic Peace, in GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY 7, 27–28 (Rachel A. Epstein & 
Pascal Vennesson eds., 2006). 
125 See David Isenberg, Dogs of War: Who Protects the Protectors?, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Aug. 1, 
2008 (noting how the absence of a military uniform allows private contractors to work beyond the 
scope of military personnel). 
126 See Bradley Graham, Ex-GIs Work To Give Bosnian Force a Fighting Chance, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 29, 1997, at A1 (referencing President Clinton’s military aid plan to Bosnians with the use of 
retired military personnel); Bradley Graham, U.S. Firm Exports Military Expertise: Role in Training 
Croatian Army Brings Publicity and Suspicions, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1995, at A1 (noting how 
private contractors can be used for projects that the U.S. military is unwilling to do); Renae Merle, 
More Civilians Accompanying U.S. Military: Pentagon Is Giving More Duties to Contractors, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 22, 2003, at A10 (highlighting the Defense Department’s acknowledgement of the use of 
private contractors for undesired assignments). 
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to formally ally the U.S. with Croatia, this was exactly the practice 
President Clinton followed when he wanted to assist the Croats’ military 
effort against Slobodan Milosevic.127 
Democratic accountability is agnostic to the question of how the public 
ought to weigh the sacrifice of public soldiers and private troops.128  A 
public preference approving or disapproving the use of private force is 
only relevant to the extent that the public is able to acquire the necessary 
information to make its judgment and effectuate that judgment through its 
elected officials, both in the presidency and legislature. 
Does privatizing national security short-circuit the democratic 
accountability of the government in foreign policy?  The use of private 
force reduces transparency through increased layers of removal of 
governmental policy that occur when private actors are brought into the 
fold and operate, independent of public troops and the lifting of formal 
information-forcing devices designed to facilitate public disclosure. As 
private actors, PMCs are specifically exempt from Freedom of Information 
Act (“FOIA”) requests129 and can object to other formal mechanisms 
designed to force disclosure of commercial information as an infringement 
of proprietary interests.130 
Inhibited transparency alone, however, is insufficient to delegitimate 
private force.  For example, it would be a legal fiction to posit that the 
Executive Branch controls the actions of a Private First Class soldier in the 
execution of military missions.  Every additional bureaucratic layer fosters 
less transparency, but does not create a constitutional dilemma. 
                                                                                                                          
127 See Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of 
Mercenary Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 25 (1999) (describing the Pentagon’s decision to refer 
the Croatian Defense Minister to private contractors); Esther Schrader, U.S. Companies Hired To Train 
Foreign Armies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, at A1 (noting the impact of the U.N. arms embargo in the 
decision to license MPRI’s work in Croatia); Mark Thompson, Generals for Hire: Confronted With Its 
Trickiest Task in Bosnia, the U.S. Has Made Plans To Pay Someone Else To Do It, TIME MAG., Jan. 
15, 1996, at 34 (referencing the Clinton administration’s refusal to send military personnel to assist in 
rearming the Bosnians and turning to private contractors for assistance). 
128 See Andrew Petter, Look Who’s Talking Now: Dialogue Theory and the Return to Democracy, 
in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 519, 
524 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (noting that democratic accountability theory is 
“normatively agnostic”). 
129 FOIA applies only to the government and not to private companies.  See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) 
(2006) (defining “agency” as a government entity); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) 
(applying the definition of “agency” under 5 U.S.C. § 551(b) to FOIA requests); see also Craig D. 
Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public Access to Private 
Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21, 31 (1999) (noting that an entity is only held 
accountable under a FOIA request if it can be subjected to the specific terms of the Act). 
130 See Singer, supra note 3, at 214 (referencing the “wall of silence” that private contractors can 
create by denying information, as well as the general difficulty in the oversight of private contractors). 
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B.  Weighing the Benefits of National Security Privatization—Policy 
Preferences and International Norms 
Reticence toward privatized national security flows from an overriding 
concern that the private sector compromises the safety of the State and its 
citizens.  If the concern is that privatizing national security compromises 
safety, mainly due to reduced democratic accountability, then we also have 
to very robustly consider the aspects of privatization that enhance safety.131 
While the layer of removal that privatization necessarily inserts 
between government and state action reduces transparency, it is also a 
reaction to underlying democratic normative judgments as to both the role 
of the military and the values inextricably linked to international legal 
norms.  Privatized force facilitates the pursuit of consistency with 
international legal norms and efficiency desired by public policy 
judgments. 
PMCs alleviate the problem of limited state resources to fight a desired 
war, whether the war is one of aggression or defense.  Understanding the 
basics of the demand for private force by states and other parties (i.e., 
NGOs and other corporations) is a crucial component to appreciating how 
(and why) PMCs are used, and if they are effective in meeting their stated 
ends. 
State use of PMCs necessarily reflects a judgment that available public 
forces are incapable or inadequate to fulfill the work necessary to carry out 
the policies of the State.132  This judgment reflects both external 
geopolitical forces and domestic policy judgments.  As demonstrated 
below, “growth” of the market for PMCs is less a product of new dynamics 
than the by-product of increased intensity (or reappearance) of externally 
oriented factors that have promoted the market through history, and 
internal judgments causing a shift away from public troops to private 
actors.  The changing dynamics of these motivators reflect normative 
judgments by states as well as political restraints—both domestic and 
international—on state action. 
Throughout history, external political factors upping the ante for 
quantity and expertise required to effectuate policy have compelled states 
to augment public troops through private means.  The end of the Cold War 
and the public eagerness for a “peace dividend” sparked a dramatic troop 
                                                                                                                          
131 National security privatization differs from its more traditional predecessors because cost-
effectiveness, while important, is arguably not the hallmark by which the effects of privatization is (nor 
should be) judged. 
132 Consistent with modern “state interest” theory, I use the “policy of the state” as a placeholder 
for the judgment of the officials empowered to effectuate a course of action that would require the 
deployment of the public armed forces.  See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE 
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (examining the definition and explanation of “state interest” in 
an international law context). 
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drawdown in the West.133  During the early 1990s, the U.S. reduced armed 
forces by thirty-five percent and cut costs by over $100 billion.134  This 
reduction in troops has not been matched with a reduced workload abroad.  
The number of armed conflicts involving Western powers during the half-
century-long Cold War has already been eclipsed in the years since it 
ended.135  The need for more troops following the bipolarity of the Cold 
War is not unique to the U.S. as world hegemon.  Countries ranging in 
power from Sri Lanka to France are finding it difficult to aggregate the 
number of troops they require.136 
The increasing advancement and dependence on technology requires 
states to find highly trained individuals to run and maintain the machinery 
of war.  The correlation between technology and military privatization is 
underscored by evidence that the more technologically advanced the state 
army, the greater degree that army has been privatized.137  In his testimony 
before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Gordon England noted that “contractors are vital in an all-volunteer 
military force,” which is due, in part, to technological expertise the 
American government cannot duplicate.138  From machine guns to infrared 
                                                                                                                          
133 See Aaron Francis O. Chan, Public War, Private Soldiers: The Explosion of Private Military 
Contracts in the Bush Administration, E-INT’L REL., Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.e-ir.info/?p=2422. 
134 See JOHN LUDDY, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, MORE NON-DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE DEFENSE 
BUDGET 1 (1994), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/90680_1.pdf 
(“[F]unding for the military has fallen by 35 percent, from $390 billion in 1985 to $252 billion in 1995 
(in constant 1995 dollars).”).  Meanwhile, nondefense spending increased around 5% during the 1990s.  
See Chris Edwards, How To Spend $2.8 Trillion, CATO INST. TAX & BUDGET BULL., Aug. 2006, at 2, 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb_0810-39.pdf (reporting that nondefense spending is 
growing rapidly and that compensation for nondefense federal workers grew 4.8%). 
135 See Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Military Capabilities in the Post Cold-War Era: Implications for 
Middle East Allies, MIDDLE EAST REV. INT’L AFFAIRS, Dec. 1998, at 37 (“Since 1991, the U.S. 
military has taken on an unprecedented number of overseas commitments . . . .”). 
136 Sri Lanka, which did not qualify for U.S. assistance due to allegations of human rights abuses, 
put out feelers to several PMCs, including MPRI, for training assistance with the justification that 
“[w]e just don’t have enough troops to protect the villages.”  Dexter Filkins, Tamil Tiger Rebels 
‘Ethnically Cleanse’ Parts of Sri Lanka, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2000, at A1.  
137 See ARMIN KRISHNAN, WAR AS BUSINESS 3 (2008) (finding that the American and British 
forces, as the most technologically advanced armed forces, also have the highest degree of 
privatization).  China, with a rapidly developing armed forces, as well as a large and captive 
population, has also publicly begun seeking and assisting domestic development of private firms for the 
purpose of maintaining and developing military equipment.  China Issues Circular on Opening 
Military Industry to Private Business, BBC MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, Aug. 6, 2007. 
138 Senator: Waste, Fraud, Neglect Hurting U.S. Soldiers, CNNPOLITICS.COM, July 23, 2008, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/23/contractor.hearing/index.html (paraphrasing statements 
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gorden England); see also Examining the Effectiveness of U.S. Efforts 
to Combat Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Corruption in Iraq: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 110th Cong. 125–31, 236–45 (2008) (statement of Gordon England, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense, Department of Defense).  Technological expertise differs substantively from the limitations 
of a small standing army.  The U.S. government possesses the legal ability to draft able-bodied men to 
fight war through conscription, but cannot, without the aid of contractors, maintain the complex 
technology the U.S. military requires to conduct war.  See Outsourcing of Security Tools Helps 
Contractors, TECH. DAILY, Mar. 30, 2007 (noting that “the federal government has sought more 
complex technology but turned to contractors to operate some of the most key undertakings”); George 
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sensors and transport planes to Predator drones, PMCs with employees 
specialized in various weapons systems are required for public troops to 
operate effectively.139 
The market for privatized force reflects not only external factors, but 
also domestic judgments of individual states that have largely been adopted 
across the international community.  Specifically, the rejection of 
conscription, value of “force protection,” internalization of global threats 
as domestic risks, enhanced respect for international human rights, and 
implicit acceptance and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention have 
raised the workload of the public military while restricting their use. 
1.  The Liberal-Democratic Rejection and Military Ineffectiveness of 
Conscription 
The forced conscription of soldiers to fight in war is more unpopular 
now than ever before.140  In 2006, seventy percent of the American public 
indicated that they oppose reinstating the draft.141  In the words of one 
commentator, “public opinion has expressed itself clearly against 
conscription.”142 
The public rejection of conscription mirrors its distrust by military 
professionals, political scientists, and economists. Experts have long 
concluded that conscripts are less motivated, less educated, less creative, 
and less reliable than those in an all-volunteer army.143  Their use is 
inefficient and potentially makes armed conflicts longer and more likely.144  
Further, data indicate that a draft leads those forced into service to civilian 
harms, including lower wages, less education, and pervasive opportunity 
                                                                                                                          
Leopold, Pentagon Urges ‘Relevant’ R&D, ELEC. ENG’G TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, at 1 (noting the 
increased reliance on technology companies by the Department of Defense). 
139 See KRISHNAN, supra note 137, at 36–39 (discussing the technology advantage of commercial 
companies over state development of technology). 
140 E.g., Brian Dickerson, Rep. Rangel’s Draft Bill Threatens War in Iraq, DETROIT FREE PRESS, 
Nov. 22, 2006, at 1; see also Christopher Jehn & Zachary Selden, The End of Conscription in Europe?, 
20 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 93, 93–95, 98 (highlighting the trend away from mandatory service in 
Europe). 
141 Dickerson, supra note 140. 
142 Rafael Ajangiz, The European Farewell to Conscription, in THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
CONSCRIPTION IN THE ARMED FORCES 307, 332 (Lars Mjøset and Stephen Van Holden eds., 2002). 
143 See generally C.E.E. Telfer-Smollett, The Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of 
Voluntary and Compulsory Service, Both from a Military and a National Point of View, 41 J. ROYAL 
UNITED SERV. INST. 919 (1897) (comparing broadly conscription-based armies with all-volunteer 
forces). 
144 See Seung-Whan Choi & Patrick James, No Professional Soldiers, No Militarized Interstate 
Disputes?, 47 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 796, 798, 800–02 (2003) (contending that “conscripted soldiers 
would seem to run against the logic of the democratic peace in that they appear to lead to international 
conflict”); see also generally THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER 
ARMED FORCE (1970) (evaluating the feasibility and effects of an all-volunteer armed services). 
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costs.145 
2.  The Force Protection Principle 
The memories of misbegotten military adventures over the course of 
the twentieth century has left the Western world with a pungent distaste for 
the death of public soldiers, especially in conflicts not considered vital to 
the national interest.  Termed “Vietnam Syndrome” in the United States, 
based on public tumult over U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, the 
term could be updated to “Somalia Syndrome,” referencing America’s 
horror and subsequent quick withdrawal from Somalia following the public 
celebration in the streets after the brutal killing of eighteen American 
servicemen.146 
The concept of force protection guides Western military actions 
today.147  Its effects manifest in a large percentage of budgetary costs, 
including more traditional protective technology of body armor and 
extending to billions of dollars spent on stealth technology, unmanned all-
terrain vehicle robots, and unmanned drone aircraft designed to keep U.S. 
soldiers as far removed from harm’s way as possible.148 
3.  Internalizing Global Threats as Domestic Risks 
Never before have the U.S. and other nations so pervasively viewed 
their own national interest at risk from the isolated actions of small groups 
thousands of miles away.  In February 2003, President Bush certified 
fighting narcotics trafficking in Guatemala as a “vital national interest” and 
opened the avenue for force and military financing because a strong 
organized crime apparatus in the country could weaken Guatemalan 
governmental institutions.149  Neither the certification nor any 
administration official contend that the organized crime referenced in 
                                                                                                                          
145 See Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, To Draft or Not To Draft? Inefficiency, Generational 
Incidence, and Political Economy of Military Conscription, 23 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 975, 976, 984 
(2007) (finding that the introduction of a military draft harms young generations). 
146 See Joshua Muravchik, Using Force as a Tourniquet, AM. ENTER. INST., Jan. 1, 1997, 
http://www.aei.org/issue/17650 (discussing the “Somalia syndrome” and its effects on U.S. domestic 
military interventions). 
147 See, e.g., Jeffrey Record, Force-Protection Fetishism: Sources, Consequences, and (?) 
Solutions, AIR & SPACE POWER J., Summer 2000, at 4, 4–6 (describing instances when American 
behavior “reflected a desperate unwillingness to place satisfaction of US armed intervention’s political 
objective ahead of the safety of its military instrument”). 
148 See Jeffrey Record, Operation Allied Force: Yet Another Wake-Up Call for the Army?, 
PARAMETERS, Winter 1999–2000, at 15, 16 (“Minimizing risk—force protection—has become more 
important than military effectiveness.”). 
149 See Overview of U.S. Policy Toward the Western Hemisphere: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on the Western Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 108th Cong. 15 (2003) 
(statement of John P. Walters, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy) (“The President 
provided a vital national interest certification to Guatemala because the suspension of assistance to 
Guatemala would result in further deterioration of precisely those Guatemalan institutions that are 
essential to combating the influence of organized crime in Guatemala.”). 
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Guatemala possesses the means or motive to harm the United States other 
than supplying it with highly-demanded drugs. 
Perception of increased need for strong military force is not, however, 
simply sparked by increased sensitivity to gravity of risk.  The public 
perception of which risks substantively constitute a U.S. national security 
concern has expanded.150  Globalization has caused commercial interests to 
become completely intertwined with a perception that far away risks 
possess national security implications at home.  This phenomenon is not 
unique to the United States.  In a study performed by Gary Becker and 
Yona Rubinstein, commercial cycles in Israel would be disrupted due to 
terrorist attacks inside Israeli borders.151  Even minor attacks would cause 
substantial business losses because people became less inclined to leave 
their homes and engage in commercial transactions, thus harming the 
domestic economy.152 
The trend of international interventions for humanitarian reasons is 
also evidence of an increasingly expansive view of U.S. interests requiring 
military action.  At the time NATO troops began air strikes against Serbia, 
there was no clear indication that the Serbian regime possessed any designs 
against other countries, and clearly possessed neither the ability nor desire 
to engage in fighting with the United States.153  The justification for armed 
intervention was couched as an affirmative responsibility to preclude an 
ongoing genocide.  The justification was moral—not legal or strategic.154 
These normative movements, prevalent among industrialized states, 
have led to a generalized urgency to possess the ability to project military 
power in short order, while simultaneously reducing the capacity to do so 
                                                                                                                          
150 See Brigitte L. Nacos et al., Prevention of Terrorism in Post-9/11 America: News Coverage, 
Public Perceptions, and the Politics of Homeland Security, 20 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 1, 2–3, 
5, 8 (2008) (arguing that Americans and the media have focused more on terror threats since September 
11 as compared to before September 11); cf. Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in 
Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 
493, 493 (2007) (discussing the increasing importance of undercover policing following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11). 
151 Gary S. Becker & Yona Rubinstein, Fear and the Response to Terrorism: An Economic 
Analysis 5 (Aug. 1, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/ 
international/events/upload/BeckerrubinsteinPaper.pdf. 
152 Id. 
153 See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 773 (2004) (“Serbia posed no threat to the 
United States; it had neither the capability to attack the United States or its forces, nor the manifest 
hostility to do so.”). 
154 See Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 32 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1231, 1235 (1999) (finding that “humanitarian intervention arguably provides a lawful 
foundation for the NATO actions,” though the U.N. Charter does not make an exception to the 
prohibitions on the use of force); Lawrence J. Korb, Force Is the Issue, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, Jan. 2000, 
at 31 (recalling President Clinton’s speech to NATO troops when he told them “[w]e should not 
countenance genocide or ethnic cleansing anywhere in the world”).  As the NATO action was clearly 
counter to established international law regarding the use of force, other multi-national peacekeeping 
actions (for example under the auspices of the U.N.) also require public troops from sources where 
such troops are a rare commodity. 
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as other conflicts arise.  The result is a demand for military capabilities that 
can be delivered now. 
C.  Instrumental and Strategic Efficacy and Privatization 
The instrumental and policy benefits made possible by privatization 
are often overlooked in favor of an analysis of purported harms.  This is 
unfortunate because an exclusive focus on the potential normative harms of 
privatization represents only part of the calculus necessary to inform policy 
and influence law.  Incorporating private actors in national security 
functions enables the government to save money, draw on specialized 
skills residing exclusively in the private sector, and retain more of its 
investment in training its own forces.  Privatization also enhances policy 
flexibility that expands the possibilities of how force and foreign policy 
can be projected. 
1.  Instrumental Advantages of National Security Privatization 
The transition to an all-volunteer force in the United States (and other 
democracies) has changed the face of how the military is organized and 
how it recruits.  The United States enjoys a more professional, educated, 
and skilled military than ever before.155  Despite this, the private sector 
offers several dimensions in which it can enhance, augment, or supersede 
the government’s performance of services.  Privatization increases the 
quality and quantity of labor from which the government can draw, thus 
enhancing the quality of services through intellectual diversity and 
specialization.156  Privatized force also provides the military with 
secondary retention benefits that allow the utilization of military-generated 
skills that would otherwise be lost.157 
  a.  Cost Efficiency and Effectiveness 
The cost efficiency and effectiveness of national security privatization 
have been controversial.  Many claim the use of PMCs undermines the 
threshold question of turning to the private sector—economic savings.158  
                                                                                                                          
155 See David R. Segal & Mady Wechsler Segal, America’s Military Population, POPULATION 
BULL., Dec. 2004, at 1, 3 (“The all-volunteer military is more educated . . . than the draft-era 
military.”); see also Larry W. Isaac & Daniel M. Harrison, Corporate Warriors: The State and 
Changing Forms of Private Armed Force in America, 24 CURRENT PERSP. SOC. THEORY 153, 155 
(2006) (outlining the transformation of military services to the current state). 
156 See Yusuf Alabarda & Rafal Lisowiec, The Private Military Firms: Historical Evolution and 
Industry Analysis 17 (June 2007) (MBA Professional Report, Naval Postgraduate School), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA473255&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
157 Id. 
158 See SINGER, supra note 3, at 157 (finding that the military has not substantiated its claims of 
the savings that result from military outsourcing); David Isenberg, Dogs of War: Cost-Effective: Myth 
or Fact?, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Apr. 25, 2008 (arguing that more oversight and accounting of 
contractors is needed to ensure that there are real cost savings and greater efficiency). 
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Some commentators have indicated that cost-savings are a lesser priority in 
national security and simple effectiveness should be the only gauge in 
assessing the value of PMCs.159  The efficient utilization of monetary 
resources, however, even in wealthy countries, materially affects the ability 
to project force.160  In other words, a dollar spent on a contractor who could 
be easily replaced by a public soldier for ninety cents is ten cents wasted, 
money that could have been used elsewhere. 
In this vein, several scholars have argued that the cost-savings benefits 
of PMCs are illusory due to the high cost of securing contractors.161  As an 
example, when MPRI was contracted to take over ROTC training, its cost 
per instructor was $10,000 higher per year than the public instructors it 
replaced.162  More recently, reports that another PMC, KBR, was charging 
the military tens of millions of dollars for fuel delivery presented 
additional anecdotal evidence that the cost-savings of PMCs were, at best, 
highly limited.163 
Empirically, judging whether the use of PMCs is economically 
efficient depends entirely on the frame of reference.  The United States has 
spent over $85 billion for the work of military contractors since the 
beginning of the war and the tab was expected to climb to over $100 
billion by the end of 2008.164  According to a recent Congressional Budget 
Office Report, the costs to support a soldier and a contractor in the field 
during wartime are roughly the same.165 
The State, however, is not always at war.  At the conclusion of a 
conflict, or as a conflict winds down, the State can reduce its usage of 
PMCs in a way unavailable with public soldiers.  As public soldiers must 
be trained and remain prepared for action at any time, they cannot be 
discarded as the need for their services wanes.  Those soldiers continue to 
draw a full salary and accrue benefits packages.166  Because public soldiers 
remain in the force structure much longer, during peacetime the public 
                                                                                                                          
159 This is a claim that is effectively countered when cost-effectiveness is included as a core 
component of overall military efficiency.  See AVANT, supra note 23, at 117–18 (discussing the tension 
between cost savings and effectiveness in the privatization of ROTC training). 
160 See id. at 259 (“Strong states that take advantage of the market buy increased power in the 
form of raw capacity to project their interests abroad. . . . Though US raw military power was already 
dominant without it, its use of private security has further enhanced its relative capacity to project 
military force.”). 
161 See, e.g., Minow, supra note 3, at 1011–12; Dickinson, supra note 33, at 149 n.45 (contending 
that cost savings have not been demonstrated). 
162 Deborah Avant, The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force, 5 INT’L 
STUD. PERSP. 153, 155 (2004). 
163 Id.; see also Brett Clanton, Audit Faults KBR Costs in Iraq, HOUS. CHRON., June 26, 2007, at 1 
(discussing findings that KBR incorrectly accounted for the amount of fuel it used, among other errors). 
164 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONTRACTORS’ SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 
2 (2008). 
165 Id. 
166 See id. at 14 (discussing the costs for private security contractors compared with military 
resources). 
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soldier’s cost is approximately cut in half, while contractors can be 
immediately dismissed, reducing costs to a negligible amount.167  Over a 
period of ten years, half assumed to be peacetime, the privatization of 
security services alone is estimated to save the government over one billion 
dollars.168 
  b.  Special Skills and Expertise 
Specialized skills are expensive to produce and create value in their 
holder that is redeemable in the private sector in a way that is impossible to 
replicate through public employment.169  Public pay scales are highly fixed 
and resist market forces even in circumstances in which the skill set sought 
by a civil employee is both objectively and subjectively highly valued.  As 
a result, unsurprisingly, private contractors often possess expertise that is 
both highly demanded and financially under-compensated in the public 
sector.  Under these circumstances especially, use of private sector actors 
can enhance the effectiveness of the military through contracting with 
corporate entities that have collected a labor force already skilled in the 
national security functions required by the government.  This is even more 
so the case when the need for such skill sets are temporary and arise 
unpredictably. 
Specialization and expertise benefits run across the spectrum of 
privatization services—technological expertise impacts all aspects of the 
military.  The need for special expertise in intelligence is acute.  
Contractors operating in human intelligence gathering often possess skills 
in domestic law enforcement or foreign language skills.  Intelligence 
contractors engaged in electronic surveillance and open source intelligence 
gathering combine technological expertise and analytical skills with proven 
effectiveness.170  PMCs specializing in security operations operate 
databases that allow them to recruit from contractors with particular skills 
or particular experiences matching the type of mission for which they were 
contracted to perform—i.e., language or security details for government 
officials.171  The greatest numbers of private contractors provide logistical 
                                                                                                                          
167 Id. at 14, 17. 
168 Id. 
169 See 1 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, 1 MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES 80–82 (1962) (discussing the reasons behind and purpose of specialization). 
170 The prowess of intelligence contractors is demonstrable through published war games 
performed by military intelligence and the CIA.  In one, contractors circumvented protections of 
governmental computer systems, gained root systems access and the ability to cause power outages in 
every major city, and disrupted military communications.  SINGER, supra note 3, at 286 n.87.  In a 
similar exercise, the CIA was in competition with various other organizations to gather the information 
necessary for a hypothetical intervention in Burundi.  Not only did a PMC defeat the CIA, but the CIA 
finished in last place.  Id. at 100. 
171 See Eugenio Cusumano, Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: A Multifaceted 
and Multilayered Approach 10 (European Univ. Inst. Working Paper, AEL 2009/11, 2008), available 
at http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/12953/1/AEL_2009_11.pdf. 
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and technological support to the public military.  The specialization of 
skills necessary to run military machinery has reached the point where not 
only is it prohibitively expensive to do within the military, but private 
contractors themselves must highly specialize their skill set to be able to 
effectively address the complexities of the technology they maintain.172  
The bureaucratic strictures of the public sector do not allow the 
government the flexibility to identify, hire, or deploy these different skill 
sets as they might be needed.173 
2.  Policy Advantages of National Security Privatization 
  a.  Surge and Diffusion Capacity 
The increased lethality of non-state insurgents and terrorist 
organizations enhances non-state actors’ ability to influence state action 
through isolated, but deadly, incidents of force.  Identifying these 
decentralized threats is difficult; effectively countering them requires a 
degree of deployment flexibility and expediency that would be enormously 
difficult and expensive for the public military to attain.  Similarly, private 
contractors do not have to be rotated out of theater as do public soldiers. 
Thus, the government can hire fewer contractors and receive more full-
time-equivalent service for their deployment than is possible with public 
troops.  The ability to hire and deploy contractors quickly not only 
provides a needed surge capacity in the midst of armed conflict, but also 
facilitates the deployment of a small number of troops to parts of the world 
where the State has little presence.174 
  b.  Mission Focus 
Privatizing ancillary national security functions allows the military and 
its soldiers to focus on developing and executing its core competencies.175  
The greater the ability of the military to focus on preparing and planning 
for combat and conflict contingencies, the more the military benefits 
through superior soldiers and superior planning, and execution of war 
                                                                                                                          
172 See, e.g., id. at 4. 
173 Deborah D. Avant, Contracting for Services in U.S. Military Operations, 40 PS: POL. SCI. & 
POL. 457, 458 (2007) (discussing how it is more difficult for the military than for a private contractor to 
find specific skill sets). 
174 See id. at 457 (“As quickly as these forces can appear, they can disappear; once dangers pass 
or local forces are trained and deployed, contracts can lapse and these personnel can be quickly de-
mobilized.”). 
175 See Kyle Ballard, The Privatization of Military Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution of 
the Private Military Industry, in PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES: CHANCES, 
PROBLEMS, PITFALLS AND PROSPECTS 48–49 (Thomas Jager & Gerhard Kummel eds., 2007) 
(discussing, for example, how the use of PMCs for weapon-system or military hardware expertise can 
allow the Department of Defense the “ability to focus on its core competencies”). 
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plans.176  Studies indicate that the ability to focus on non-logistical, 
combat-oriented training and preparation is a consistent factor in soldiers 
reporting high job satisfaction.177 
  c.  Internationalization of Force 
The privatized force industry’s ability to draw personnel from a variety 
of nationalities and backgrounds affords the State opportunities to diversify 
its presence in a way that more closely matches indigenous culture than 
would public force.  There is usually tension whenever a state deploys its 
military in another country.  This tension may be uncomfortable when 
soldiers are placed in allied countries, but can be deadly in the context of a 
military occupation.  In either circumstance, however, incorporating the 
indigenous population into military operations is an effective way to 
reduce tensions with the citizenry.178  Similarly, the economic benefits that 
follow local contracting practices may reduce tension with the indigenous 
population. 
D.  The Alternatives to National Security Privatization 
An analysis of the congruence between PMCs and the public military 
would not be complete without consideration of alternative sources of 
force the State could and does utilize outside of each of those spheres: 
covert action and proxy fighters.  These potential alternatives are 
especially important to the extent that the use of PMCs offers political 
advantages (whether international or domestic) that cannot be accrued 
through public soldiers, thus affecting our examination of the impact on 
democratic accountability. 
1.  Proxy Fighters 
The U.S. has a long history of utilizing proxy fighters in order to exert 
influence abroad without resorting to sending U.S. troops.  In the past 
twenty years, the U.S. has financed and aligned itself with proxy fighters in 
                                                                                                                          
176 See id. at 48 (discussing how using PMCs can free up resources, thereby allowing the 
Department of Defense to “fully implement its security strategy”). 
177 See generally Rebecca P. Sanchez et al., Predictors of Job Satisfaction Among Active Duty and 
Reserve/Guard Personnel in the U.S. Military, 16 MIL. PSYCHOL. 1 (2004). 
178 See David M. Edelstein, Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail, 
29 INT’L SECURITY 49, 51 (2006) (noting that hiring local citizens as private contractors reduces 
opposition by local populations and represents part of making a “credible guarantee that [the power] 
will withdraw and return control to an indigenous government in a timely manner”); Marco E. Harris, 
The Use of Security Professionals in Counterinsurgency Operations 7 (Mar. 15, 2008) (unpublished 
M.S.S. research project, U.S. Army War College), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? 
AD=ADA480183&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (“To gain trust and legitimacy local public 
safety agencies and defense forces must be given training if needed and the opportunity [to] work 
independent of security forces.”). 
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Afghanistan, Colombia,179 Iraq,180 Iran,181 Kosovo,182 and others.183 
Following September 11, the U.S. again relied on proxy fighters in 
Afghanistan to strengthen and hold their regional presences and thus 
reduce the pressure on U.S. and Coalition troops to occupy the whole 
country.184  After Coalition troops surrounded Tora Bora, the area believed 
to contain a number of high-level Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders, the U.S. 
made the decision to use its Northern Alliance proxies to complete the final 
stage of the mission and attempt to capture or kill the al-Qaeda leaders that 
remained.  Not only was the mission a failure, but numerous reports also 
indicate that local fighters facilitated the flight of the very leaders they 
were tasked to capture.185  In addition to such specific operational 
breakdowns, the U.S. financing of a variety of non-state militias has 
created numerous paramilitaries with regional control that match or exceed 
the power of the Afghani central government thus compromising the very 
survival of the regime installed following the fall of the Taliban.186 
Proxy fighters offer a source of force that requires less commitment of 
human and financial American resources than the deployment of an 
equivalent number of public soldiers or PMCs.  Even more importantly, 
proxy fighters also possess an intrinsically local character that offers a 
substantially greater degree of domestic and international legitimacy than 
                                                                                                                          
179 Colombian proxy fighters are instrumental elements of the U.S. war on drugs.  See Maria 
Cristina Caballero, Peace at Any Price, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 2003, at 30 (noting that “Washington has 
invested $2.5 billion in Bogota’s Plan Columbia anti-drug initiative”); Kate Joynes, Migration and 
Organised Crime Top Mexican-US Agenda, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Mar. 1, 2007 (mentioning Colombia’s 
financial benefits of “committing itself to the U.S.-led war on drugs”); Chris Kraul, Agents’ Deaths 
Reveal Problems Along Border, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 17, 2007, at 40. 
180 Primarily the Kurds in the north of the country.  See Susan Taylor Martin, Iraqi Kurds 
Optimistic in Face of Uncertainty, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 23, 2004, at A1. 
181 The Iran-Contra affair is the most prominent example of proxy fighters in Iran.  See REPORT 
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. NO. 100-
433, S. REP. NO. 100-216, at 15–17 (1987) [hereinafter IRAN-CONTRA REPORT] (discussing covert 
operations and the utilization of “private parties and third countries to do the Government’s business”). 
182 The U.S. provided aid to the Kosovo Liberation Army during its conflict with the Serb national 
army.  See Christian Jennings, Kosovo’s Local Heroes on UN’s Wanted List, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, 
June 11, 2000, at 22 (discussing U.S. and European aid and terming the Kosovo Liberation Army the 
“covert darlings of the West”). 
183 See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence 
over Political Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L. L. 1, 2 (1989) (discussing the influence of the West through, in 
part, covert actions in various states). 
184 See Democracy’s Chance in Afghanistan, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2004, at 12 (“America fought a 
largely proxy war using the militias of the Northern Alliance . . . .”).  The relationship between the 
United States and the Northern Alliance was a critical part of the campaign in Afghanistan, especially 
in its early stages. David R. Sands, After Zarqawi, What’s Next?, WASH. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at A1 
(noting that the “Northern Alliance played a critical role in the U.S.-led campaign that ousted the 
Taliban regime”). 
185 See Thomas Carothers, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 
2003, at 84 (asserting that “the strategy [of using proxies] seems also to have been a partial military 
miscalculation, leading to the escape of a significant number of al Qaeda fighters at Tora Bora”). 
186 See id. (stating that the Pentagon’s initial reliance on Afghan warlords as proxy fighters 
“helped to entrench the centrifugal politics that threaten Afghanistan’s weak new government”). 
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the external use of force.  This was undoubtedly a major factor in the U.S. 
decision to use Afghan proxies at Tora Bora.187 
There are two major difficulties with proxy fighters as a legitimate 
choice of force for states.  First, the legitimacy gain through the use of 
proxy fighters is compromised the more that the external funding and 
support is required.  In other words, the greater the need for external 
support, the less likely that they will ultimately be able to retain power 
once they gain control of the land they seek to gain.188  Second, proxy 
fighters are almost completely outside the scope of control of the 
sponsoring state as it relates to the manner in which they use violence to 
achieve their ends.189  This absence of control extends to all forms of 
accountability of the sponsoring state to seek to rein in their proxy forces 
in response to democratic pressures.  This is especially true when proxy 
fighters are in contexts in which the participation and support of the 
sponsoring state is achieved covertly à la Iran-Contra.190  Supplementing 
public force with PMCs offers enormously greater transparency and 
normative advantages compared to using proxy fighters, who represent a 
likely alternative in the market for non-state force. 
2.  Increased Covert Action 
Expanding the mission of covert governmental operatives abroad 
offers the possibility of achieving U.S. policy goals while ensuring that 
public servants carry out foreign policy plans.  The use of governmental 
operatives already takes place without public knowledge.  The United 
States implemented covert training and low-level combat operations in 
Afghanistan following September 11, but did so before public 
acknowledgement of military operations.191  Presently, reports that the U.S. 
is training Iranian insurgents continue to circulate. 
One might think that to the extent the question of motivation is the 
overriding aspect of behavior and decisions, covert operations would be an 
attractive option relative to the use of PMCs.  Covert military operatives 
would presumably possess the same normative culture lauded in the 
military and generally emanates from the same community and education 
that binds all soldiers. 
                                                                                                                          
187 See id. 
188 Afghanistan’s struggle against the Soviet Union during the 1980s, and its subsequent collapse 
into Taliban hands serves as a simple reminder of this principle. 
189 See Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility, and the Use of Military 
Force, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 97, 104 (2003) (“[A] state must direct and control the activities of the [proxy 
fighters] . . . before their acts will be attributable to that state.”). 
190 See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 181, at 15–17 (discussing how the administration 
covertly funded operations that lacked accountability and oversight by Congress). 
191 Michael Duffy & Massimo Calabresi, Letting Up on Osama, TIME MAG., Aug. 11, 2003, at 15; 
see also John Donnelly, CIA Are Reportedly Active in Iraq, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Jan. 5, 
2003, at 1 (discussing supposed activities of CIA operatives in Iraq before the start of the war in 2003). 
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The difficulty is the inherent preclusion of public knowledge (and thus 
public policy assessment) of covert actions.  Throughout history, covert 
operations tend to either originate or trend outside the confines of 
government limiting law.192  Today there are repeated reports that 
government soldiers continue training groups even after congressional 
prohibitions of such training.193 
V.  THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The prevalent theoretical and empirical tendencies outlined (and 
rejected) in Parts II and III have led to undue claims that PMCs possess 
inherent flaws, both in concept and in practice.  In fact, policy surrounding 
privatization is the problem. 
Arguments against PMCs share a foundation characterizing the 
motivation of the private sector—profit—as a fountainhead of harms in 
projecting state force.194  This foundation should be unequivocally rejected.  
Emphasis on profit as the relevant factor of analysis ignores dimensions 
more directly indicative of the normative character of privatized services 
and, paradoxically, encourages policy makers to pass over decisions 
directly affecting the underlying policies that contractors are said to offend. 
Eschewing the attempt to transform profit-motive into a placeholder 
for other intrinsic qualities, this Article encourages a view of national 
security privatization firmly planted upon analytic pillars of domestic 
accountability and national security efficacy.  The rejection of profit 
motive as a relevant factor in favor of the observable traits of privatized 
service providers avoids the theoretical and empirical fallacies outlined in 
Parts II and III.  Further, it produces a more flexible and effective 
utilization of privatized military service that leads to both conventionally 
unsurprising and counterintuitive results. 
A.  The Consequences of Prohibiting Privatizing National Security 
Functions 
The surge of commentary condemning privatized military functions 
has sparked federal legislation prohibiting certain varieties of contractors, 
held up high-level military appointments, and influenced Blackwater, one 
                                                                                                                          
192 Iran-Contra and the unauthorized bombings of Cambodia during the Vietnam War are obvious 
examples.  See Symposium, The United States Military Action in Cambodia, 1970, in the Light of 
International and Constitutional Law, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–2, 26, 38 (1971) (discussing possible 
international law violations, the questionable constitutionality, and the legal dimensions of the 
Cambodia incursion); David J. Scheffer, U.S. Law and the Iran-Contra Affair, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 696, 
696–97 (1987) (discussing how the Iran-Contra affair raised issues of potential violations of 
international law). 
193 See AVANT, supra note 23, at 155 (noting that government by proxy “violates the official US 
line”). 
194 See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text. 
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of the nation’s largest military security contractors, to announce it was 
moving away from security work in favor of other business 
opportunities.195 
Determining the effects of using private actors makes policy, as it 
should; but incorrect or poorly established determinations make bad policy.  
Legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate in August 2008, entitled the 
“Restoring America’s Integrity Act” (“RAIA”), prohibits contractors from 
engaging in interrogation.196  Announcing the legislation, Senator Diane 
Feinstein stated that, “I also believe that the use of contractors leads to 
more brutal interrogations than if they were done by Government 
employees.”197  In the same statement, Senator Feinstein noted, “We 
remain a nation at war, and credible, actionable intelligence remains a 
cornerstone of our war effort.”198 
The wisdom of legislation like RAIA depends on a conclusion that 
privatized national security providers (either as institutions or through 
individuals) are “different” from public troops in a way that accrues 
negative consequences.  Not only is the data supporting this suspect, but 
moreover, the legislation ignores the efficacy of bringing private sector 
benefits to bear on a very public problem.  Private intelligence contractors 
often possess more experience in interrogation than their military 
counterparts.199  That experience is usually gained through work in the 
domestic criminal law enforcement realm, where they are trained to 
conduct their interrogations in accordance with heavy domestic 
restrictions.  These intelligence contractors also tend to have specialized 
language skills that make their services highly profitable and portable.200  
A failure to address efficacy gains of the privatization represents a failure 
to understand the parallel tracks of efficiency in relationship to 
accountability.  An appropriate analysis of national security privatization 
creates a direct comparison between the benefits accrued by privatization 
against the potential harms unique to privatization. 
                                                                                                                          
195 Elana Schor, Blackwater To Leave Security Business Following Problems in Iraq, GUARDIAN, 
July 22, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/22/usa.iraq. 
196 Restoring America’s Integrity Act, S. 3437, 110th Cong. § 3 (2008). 
197 154 CONG. REC. S8045 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2008) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
198 Id. 
199 See, e.g., Paul Kern et al., Military Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib Prison, FED. NEWS 
SERV., Aug. 25, 2004; Tony L. Thacker, Interrogation: Is the US Army Equipped and Trained To Meet 
the Present Challenges in Today’s Contemporary Operational Environment? 4 (June 16, 2006) 
(unpublished M.M.A.S. thesis, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA452049&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; but see 
George R. Fay, Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence 
Brigade, in THE ABU GHRAIB INVESTIGATIONS 107, 110–11 (Steven Strasser ed., 2004) (stating that 
civilian contractors often do not have formal training in military interrogation techniques). 
200 See Farah Stockman, Civilians ID’d in Abuse May Face No Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 
2004, at A1 (noting private contractors’ technical expertise in interrogation); Fran Wood, 
Unconventional Justice?, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), May 15, 2005, at 3 (referring to language and 
contractor cultural expertise in interrogations). 
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B.  Constitutional and Policy Consequences of the Legitimization and 
Incorporation of Private Force 
When a democratic government is improperly insulated from political 
accountability, it can act recklessly as to its policies, and in the context of 
war, engage in military conflict without democratic checks that ensure 
public awareness and accountability. 
If, however, the dynamics of the market are set and the need for 
utilizing alternative sources of force persist, the relevant policy question 
revolves around which source of non-state actor force possesses a 
comparative advantage consistent with democratic accountability 
principles.  Answering this requires an analysis of force projecting 
possibilities and the structural elements of those options through the lens of 
democratic principles. 
1.  Setting the Standard for Democratic Accountability in Issues of 
National Security 
The baseline standard of processes and public access to decisions 
affecting policies of war and peace must be that of the public military.  
Democratic accountability principles contemplate, and the contours of 
information available to fulfill those principles reflect, an attempt to 
balance between openness and effectiveness based on the context of 
governmental action—in this case, the delicate, but fundamentally 
important decisions of war and peace.201 
In many ways, the military is the most carefully reviewed agency of 
the federal government as a formal matter.  As one of the largest recipients 
of federal dollars, the budget of the Department of Defense is subject to 
endless scrutiny.202  The Department of Defense has been subject to more 
reports by the General Accounting Office (now the Government 
Accountability Office) than any other branch.203  The breadth of these 
reports runs the entire gamut of military operations, from procurement, to 
training, to contractor oversight and military affairs.204  Despite broad 
                                                                                                                          
201 Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in TAMING 
GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130, 132 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 
eds., 2004) (“[Policies] are only legitimate if they conform to broadly democratic principles, 
appropriately adapted for the context.”). 
202 See Federal Budget Spending and the National Debt, http://www.federalbudget.com/ (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2010) (showing that, in 2008, the Department of Defense was given the second largest 
amount of money by Congress, with the Department of Health and Human Services getting the most). 
203 According to a search on the GAO website, more than ten percent of the reports by the GAO 
office between October 1, 2008, and October 1, 2009, were dedicated to examining the Department of 
Defense.  For how to run a similar search, see infra note 204. 
204 U.S. Government and Accountability Office—Reports and Testimonies, http://www.gao.gov/ 
docsearch/agency.php (last visited Jan. 17, 2010) (select “Department of Defense”; then select a date 
range and select “Search”) (showing the variety of reports published by the Government Accountability 
Office). 
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deference in classification determinations, the Department of Defense has 
released millions of pages of documents since the beginning of the Iraq 
War documenting meetings and decisions of both high and low level 
officials executing the war. 
Democratic accountability, however, is not only about formal 
accounting mechanisms, but also about whether the justifications of the 
military are presented to the American people to make intrinsically 
political judgments about the desirability and validity of government 
action. 
The transparency and enforceability of democratic norms in this 
context, however, should not be overstated.  Viewing the intrinsic nature of 
national security as a realm in which the retention of classified information 
is considered of paramount importance, traditional mechanisms of 
democratic accountability are compromised and often purposefully 
evaded.205  To start, public military action often takes place in areas that 
provide limited and challenged access to independent observers, such as 
combat zones.  Similarly, media restrictions imposed by the military during 
wartime, even in circumstances where a plausible security concern is 
difficult to discern, such as the prohibition of photographing American 
coffins being transported back to American soil or photographic 
restrictions of “identifying characteristics” of detainees at Guantánamo 
Bay, present obstacles inherent to contemporary military regulations.206 
The public military is also insulated from formal accountability 
mechanisms as a policy matter due to its mission of national security.  
While the Department of Defense is formally encompassed within the 
ambit of FOIA, much of the information one might request is covered by 
the national security exception of the statute.207  Similarly, both the CIA 
and the Department of Defense retain wide latitude in classifying 
documents at varying levels of security clearances with only cursory, and 
typically deferential, review in limited circumstances.208 
                                                                                                                          
205 See Dickinson, supra note 33, at 193–94 (“Privatizing military functions, in contrast, will be 
unlikely to make quite so big a difference in the amount of democratic oversight because even those 
military operations that are not privatized can evade many transparency norms.”). 
206 Posting of Aamer Madhani to The Swamp, http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/ 
blog/2008/07/a_sanitized_picture_of_war.html (July 26, 2008, 18:22 EST) (noting that “publishing 
photos of dead Americans is not prohibited under U.S. military [policy]”); Day to Day: Exhibit Brings 
Detainees’ ‘Pictures from Home’ (National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 5, 2007), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=9378346 (discussing photographs of 
Guantanamo Bay). 
207 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1)–(10) (2000).  While a refusal to disclose can be challenged in court, 
courts routinely prove more deferential to the national security exception than other similar provisions 
within the statute.  See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 132, at 62 (referring to the “national security 
exception to ambassadorial immunity”). 
208 See Martin E. Halstuk, When Secrecy Trumps Transparency: Why the OPEN Government Act 
of 2007 Falls Short, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 427, 428 (2008) (discussing recent doctrinal 
developments and caselaw regarding judicial review of classification decisions); Luppe B. Luppen, Just 
When I Thought I Was Out, They Pull Me Back In: Executive Power and the Novel Reclassification 
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Formal and practical obstacles to transparency may cause one to think 
that a principle of democratic accountability is impractical in causes of 
war.  The ability of the State to restrict exposure of information to the 
public, however, does not wrestle away democratic accountability when 
the overarching subject matter of the policy is of high public importance 
and subject or available to large numbers of individuals within the 
government.  This is because even highly restricted evidence contrary to 
public interests has proven likely to emerge in public due to internal 
competitive pressures within the bureaucracy and the anonymity associated 
with large government.209 
Moreover, democratic accountability does not assume perfect 
transparency; rather, it accepts both the reality and opacity of power.210  As 
such, its goal is not to gain the requisite modicum of control of official 
power in order to guide it, roughly, according to public preferences.  As a 
roughly hewn guide to following public policy preferences and adhering to 
public values, democratic accountability principles simply require the 
availability of overarching policy choices and a normative list of values 
attached with each policy choice. 
2.  Private Military Companies and Democratic Accountability 
As noted above, many of the same cultural and institutional forces in 
the public military are at play in the context of PMCs.  In one sense, as a 
formal matter, PMCs are subject to less scrutiny, both by the public at 
large and Congress, than the public military.  PMCs are not subject to 
FOIA requests nor can they typically be ordered to produce “sensitive” 
commercial information in the context of civil suits.211  Moreover, 
Congress does not possess the more detailed oversight structure over 
PMCs that it possesses over the public military.  Cases brought against 
PMCs for civil liability (other than fraud) have not yet proven successful in 
overcoming the industry’s defense of acting on behalf of the 
government.212  The question of corporate criminal liability against PMCs 
                                                                                                                          
Authority, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1115, 1117 (2007) (discussing the many publicly available records 
that were withdrawn by government intelligence agencies without meeting classification standards). 
209 See Barton Gellman et al., Surveillance Net Yields Few Suspects, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2006, at 
A1 (discussing the NSA wiretapping program and the enormous effort made to limit access to its 
existence, details, and legal justification). 
210 See Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE 13, 
20 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999) (discussing the aim to create transparent power but that agents 
of accountability realize that in reality “most things are not accessible to direct observation”). 
211 Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public 
Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21, 23, 31–32 (1999). 
212 See SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB 33 
(2004) (stating that civilian employees were not bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
that although they were bound by civilian law, it was unclear “whether American or Iraqi law would 
apply”); ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE 
BRIGADE 26 (2004), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/taguba/TAGUBA_REPORT_ 
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for the misdeeds of their employees remains a possibility, but at this time, 
remains academic.213 
The formal impositions of disclosures designed to encourage 
transparency of PMCs remains, however, within the purview of the 
legislative and judicial branches.  Congress possesses the unquestioned 
ability to require PMCs to engage in more meaningful disclosures for the 
purposes of securing and maintaining contracts with the government.  
Similarly, the judicial interpretation concerning “proprietary” information 
is within the purview of the courts.214  For purposes of this Article, 
however, the most relevant question is, even fully discounting these formal 
avenues of information disclosure, does the public possess the requisite 
information to make judgments as to the “appropriateness” of PMC action 
empowered by their elected officials? 
On the other hand, there are non-formalist influences on institutional 
behavior that make PMCs more inclined than the public military to 
disclosure.  The most substantial is the moderating and disciplining effect 
of the commercial market that encourages disclosure and the protection of 
reputation as a legitimate entity.  PMCs are repeat economic actors.  The 
success of their work is judged not only by the effectiveness of their work, 
but also whether they perform that work in a way that does not draw 
negative publicity to their sponsor.  Like an umpire in the World Series, 
their name is only called when something has gone wrong.  People do not 
care about whether a prison is privatized if it is functioning properly.  The 
public is uninterested in Blackwater contractors who guard State 
Department personnel until those contractors are engaged in an incident 
deemed inappropriate.  Thus, PMCs are highly responsive to questions 
impacting their larger commercial reputation.  Reputational concern 
extends to all of a company’s operations no matter the location or client.  
In the words of one company official, “[w]hen we sneeze in Africa, we get 
a cold in Asia.”215 
The hiring process of PMCs reflects a concern that the personnel 
utilized by those companies satisfy the highest standards of 
professionalism.  Institutional concerns, shared by contemporary public 
                                                                                                                          
CERTIFICATIONS.pdf (noting difficulties in the accountability process); Joel Brinkley & James 
Glanz, Contractors in Sensitive Roles, Unchecked, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A15 (“[P]rivate 
contractors are now carrying out highly sensitive duties that until very recently were the province of 
government agencies only.”). 
213 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(G) (2006) (providing that a district court may hold an employee in 
contempt of court for noncompliance with a court order); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2006) (authorizing the heads of United States departments or agencies to “take such actions, 
commensurate with the sensitivity of that information, as are necessary to protect that information from 
disclosure”). 
214 See Feiser, supra note 211, at  35 (noting that an exemption to FOIA depends on the way 
federal courts define “agency record”). 
215 AVANT, supra note 23, at 221. 
 898 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:853 
militaries (largely reflecting the norms of their surrounding societies), have 
greatly influenced how PMCs view the currency of their reputation.216  In 
Sierra Leone, one private security firm refused to engage in offensive 
operations against the country’s rebels due to a concern that the firm would 
be accepting a “mercenary” tag that would affect future employment with 
large Western states and the U.N.217  The largest customers of PMCs and 
the standards that they require in the execution of their contracts shape 
PMC standards.218  In the context of the current security situation, the 
United States and major international non-governmental organizations like 
the U.N. control corporate operating and performance standards.219 
The possibility of a negative incident tainting a contractor is much 
higher than in the public system.  When public soldiers engage in an 
apparent unlawful shooting of civilians, as in Haditha, their blame is 
individualized and generally perceived by the public as not implicating the 
military as a whole.220  A similar incident by PMC personnel is perceived 
as evidence of a larger socialized problem with the use of contractors.  In 
the context of the Abu Ghraib scandal, polls indicate that the public 
accepted the explanation of military and civilian assertions that the acts of 
prison guards reflected “a few bad apples.”221  The opinion of the 
contractors acting as interrogators was much more likely to reflect a larger 
concern that implicated the entire company. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The arguments that the privatization of national security represents 
serious constitutional and democratic harms are overblown.  The core 
concern of privatization opponents rests upon a foundation that national 
security, the quintessential public good, cannot survive the taint of profit 
motive among those responsible for its delivery.  The reality is quite 
different. 
The legal structure governing private actors must balance a healthy 
concern over undemocratic manipulation by government, while 
                                                                                                                          
216 John W. Meyer, The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 51 INT’L ORG. 623, 633 
(1997) (discussing how, in a similar vein, “[t]he institutionalization of environmental concern . . . 
seems to have modestly affected the character of the whole world environmental enterprise”). 
217 AVANT, supra note 23, at 85–86. 
218 See id. at 220–21 (noting that larger consumers have more of an effect on PMCs and the 
market’s ecology than weak state consumers). 
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220 See Michael Duffy et al., The Ghosts of Haditha, TIME MAG., June 12, 2006, at 26. 
221 See Just a Few Bad Apples?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005. 
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recognizing the special limitations and requirements of national security 
policy.  Resolving the tension between these concerns enables a forward-
looking legal approach that garners normative advantages that are typically 
not ascribed to utilizing the private sector. 
